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Abstract
This paper explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers
three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when
regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How
should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which
voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent
extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because
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voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office.
As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent
extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local
preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but
ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that
explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in
charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments
splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if
information varies enough across regions. JEL codes: D72, D82, H73, H77
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I. Introduction
In the run-up to Scotlands 2014 independence referendum, the Scottish Government pub-
lished a guide setting out its case for independence. Alex Salmond, the premier, argued that
Scotland ought to become independent because its people are di¤erent from those of other
parts of the British Isles and thus need a di¤erent government of their own. After Scotland
becomes independent ... the people of Scotland are in charge. It will no longer be possible
for governments to be elected and pursue policies against the wishes of the Scottish people
(Salmond 2013, p. x-xi).
The Scottish leaders argument nds support in the standard economic theory of scal
federalism. Its core result is the Decentralization Theorem: absent policy spillovers, decen-
tralization is more e¢ cient than centralization if regions are not identical. This proposition,
introduced by Oates (1972), has proved a remarkably general paradigm (Lockwood 2006).
Local governments can tailor their choices to the particular conditions of each jurisdiction
and thus provide higher social welfare than a single policy adopted by a common govern-
ment. With no economies of scale, each group with distinct preferences should have an
independent government (Tiebout 1956; Bewley 1981). Increasing returns and externalities
promote political integration, but heterogeneity raises the downsides of large jurisdictions
(Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Political-economy frictions provide rigorous microfoundations
for the inability of a central government to match local preferences (Lockwood 2002; Besley
and Coate 2003; Harstad 2007).
Yet, empirical evidence shows that decentralization has not consistently delivered the
benets its advocates predicted in theory (Treisman 2007). The majority of Scottish voters
that rejected independence in the referendummay have been risk averse, but not unwise. The
experience of countries all over the world teaches that decentralization can harm the quality
of government just as it can improve it. Mismanagement and lack of accountability are
common in local governments, especially in developing and transition economies (Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2006).
This paper develops a model of political agency that explains why decentralization can re-
duce accountability and answers three key questions. When regions are heterogeneous, what
determines if power should be centralized or decentralized? How many levels of government
should there be? How should state borders be drawn? Our theory is grounded on the obser-
vation that regions di¤er not only in preferences the focus of the classic theory but also
in their ability to monitor elected o¢ cials and hold government accountable. Government
accountability varies widely within the United States: o¢ cial corruption in Louisiana and
Mississippi is ve times as prevalent as in Oregon and Washington (Glaeser and Saks 2006).
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We study public goods provided by self-interested politicians whose goal is to extract
wasteful rents. To keep extracting rents they need to win re-election, so their corruption is
constrained by career concerns. Electoral discipline provides both incentives and screening.
Politicians di¤er in ability and voters try to dismiss unskilled incumbents. Voters infer skill
from performance, so politicians are incentivized to refrain from extracting rents because
low public-good provision is punished at the polls, whether it stems from incompetence or
corruption.
Our model has two key features. First, we study heterogeneous accountability arising
from di¤erences in votersinformation. Some voters correctly observe and understand policy
outcomes, while others do not and cannot infer the incumbents ability. Second, we develop
a dynamic model with a recursive incentive structure. The expectation of future electoral
discipline a¤ects the current trade-o¤ between rent extraction and re-election. Thus, a
permanent increase in voter information has two e¤ects on electoral discipline. On the one
hand, it makes re-election more responsive to performance, raising incentives to reduce rents.
On the other hand, this very reduction in equilibrium rents lowers the appeal of re-election
and thus indirectly dampens the decline in rent extraction. In our model we nd that the
direct e¤ect always dominates, but rent extraction falls with voter information at a declining
rate because of the countervailing indirect e¤ect. When monitoring improves starting from
a low initial level, politicians react sharply because the value of o¢ ce is high. Further
improvements yield lower benets.
Our core theoretical insight follows from the concave impact of an informed population
on the quality of government. When di¤erent regions have di¤erent shares of informed
voters, centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction. Political integration creates a sin-
gle electorate with the average share of informed voters. Rent extraction falls sharply in
less informed regions, while it does not increase as much in better informed ones. Thus,
centralization yields aggregate e¢ ciency gains.
However, the distribution of these e¢ ciency gains is problematic. A centralized govern-
ment is more accountable, but disproportionately accountable to the most informed regions.
If it enjoys discretion over the geographic distribution of public goods, if favors informed
regions and neglects uninformed ones. The resulting misallocation is regressive and so costly
that centralization lowers social welfare despite reducing rents. Thus, we nd that central-
ization can be welfare-maximizing only if it is accompanied by a uniformity constraint that
requires the central government to provide identical public goods to all regions.
As a result of this endogenous need for uniformity, heterogeneous information drives a key
trade o¤. Centralization improves accountability, but it foregoes the ability to match local
public goods to idiosyncratic local preferences. Section 3 analyzes this trade o¤ and answers
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our motivating question: should government be decentralized when regions are di¤erent?
The answer depends on what type of heterogeneity is starkest. Di¤erences in tastes pull
toward decentralization; di¤erences in information push toward centralization instead.
Empirical evidence supports our results. Without a uniformity constraint, politicians
allocate spending across regions in response to voter information rather than actual needs
(Strömberg 2004). With uniformity, instead, centralization mainly benets the uninformed:
reforms decentralizing public education in Argentina and Italy had regressive e¤ects and
worsened inequality (Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky 2008; Durante, Labartino and Per-
otti 2014).
Our prediction that centralization improves government accountability is consistent with
American history. Two former state governors Don Siegelman of Alabama and Rod Blago-
jevich of Illinois are in prison for corruption. Corruption has long been considered a distinc-
tive plague of city and state governments (Ste¤ens 1904; Wilson 1966). Federal intervention
during the New Deal eradicated the patronage and political manipulation that had char-
acterized until then state and local welfare programs (Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006).
World history o¤ers other examples of accountability gains from centralization: in early
modern Europe (Besley and Persson 2011; Dincecco 2011), in pre-colonial Africa (Gennaioli
and Rainer 2007) and in transition economies (Blanchard and Shleifer 2001).
European history also provides direct support for our nding that heterogeneous account-
ability prompts centralization. Germany and Italy were unied as nation-states in the late
nineteenth century. Italy had highly heterogeneous pre-unitary institutions and became a
centralized nation-state. Instead, Germany had relatively homogeneous institutional quality
and was organized as a federal country. Both regional di¤erences in accountability and the
degree of centralization remain higher in Italy than Germany today (Ziblatt 2006).
In Section 4 we study how many levels of government there should be. The standard logic
of scal federalism suggests there should be many because every policy should be matched to
the right geographic unit. In our framework, however, we nd that multiplying government
tiers is costly because there are economies of scope in accountability. When politicians are
responsible for providing a larger set of public goods their incentives improve and they devote
a lower share of the budget to rents. Such economies of scope imply that having a single level
of government is best if information is homogeneous. A federal system can be optimal only
if di¤erences in information are large enough. Then the federal government provides large
accountability gain to poorly informed regions, while their local governments can match their
idiosyncratic preferences over policies for which taste heterogeneity is starkest.
Our model can thus explain the empirical nding that government quality declines as
the number of government tiers rises. In the United States, the proliferation of overlapping
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special-purpose local governments in charge of specic policies has been a asco (Berry
2009). Special-purpose districts are ine¢ cient and prone to capture by special interests. In
Europe, too, multiple sub-national levels of governments have led to ine¢ ciencies, and their
reduction and simplication is now on the agenda. Cross-country evidence shows a robust
positive correlation between corruption and the number of levels of government (Fan, Lin,
and Treisman 2009).
Section 5 considers what should determine the boundaries of governments when people are
not naturally sorted into internally homogeneous regions. We nd that optimal borders have
two characteristics: they cluster by tastes, but ensure maximum diversity of information.
The second goal can trump the rst when geographic constraints create a tension between
the two. A disadvantaged uninformed group should not be a local minority; it should rather
join better informed voters with similar preferences in a larger polity. E.g., breaking up
California would reduce welfare because educated San Francisco liberals ought to share a
state government with working-class left-wingers in the Central Valley.
This paper furthers the study of scal federalism and the geographic structure of gov-
ernment. Starting with Tiebouts (1956) and Oatess (1972) seminal contributions, prior
work focused exclusively on di¤erences in preferences. We show that this is only one half
of the story. Once we consider also di¤erences in voter information across regions, we nd
that the two kinds of heterogeneity have opposite implications on the optimal architecture
of government.
Di¤erences in preferences promote decentralization if the central government cannot tailor
policies to local preferences (Oates 1972; Alesina and Spolaore 2003). Assuming that ac-
countability is homogeneous across regions, prior work endogenized the failure of preference-
matching under centralization through frictions in political bargaining (Lockwood 2002;
Besley and Coate 2003; Harstad 2007). We provide an alternative microfoundation through
heterogenous voter information.
More important, we show that di¤erences in information promote centralization because
they entail larger accountability gains from political integration. Our nding suggests that
heterogeneous information is the key reason why centralization can increase accountability.
Prior work mainly emphasized instead why accountability can rise with decentralization.
In particular, decentralization can help voters monitor their local governments thanks to
yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995), while centralization entails a common-agency
problem that makes politicians less accountable to voters in any single region (Seabright
1996).1
1Although we are not the rst to model accountability gains from centralization, the potential sources
of such gains with homogeneously informed voters have always proven theoretically ambiguous (Lockwood
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Furthermore, we provide the rst theory of economies of scope in government account-
ability. Prior work considered each policy instrument in isolation, typically assessing if it
would be best centralized or decentralized (Oates 1999). We extend this line of inquiry by
studying the pros and cons of a federal structure with multiple levels of government in charge
of providing distinct public goods.2
II. Political Agency and Public-Good Provision
In this section, we present the model of political agency that underpins our analysis of
optimal political integration. Imperfectly informed voters face the problem of selecting
and incentivizing self-interested rent-seeking politicians. We model electoral discipline in
a framework of political career concerns (Alesina and Tabellini 2008). Voters try to retain
competent politicians and dismiss incompetent ones. In solving this screening problem, they
also create incentives for politicians to provide public goods. The incumbent moderates rent
extraction because higher public-good provision raises voters inference of his ability and
thus his chances of re-election.
II.A. Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely lived agents, whose preferences are
separable over time and additive in utility from private consumption and utility from each
of P public goods. Individual i in period t derives instantaneous utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
PX
p=1
ip log gp;t, (1)
where ~uit is exogenous utility from private consumption, and gp;t the provision of public good
p. We treat ~uit as an exogenous mean-zero shock and focus exclusively on public goods.
Each public good yields benets according to a logarithmic utility function. The relative
importance of each good for individual i is described by the ideal shares ip  0 such thatPP
p=1 
i
p = 1.
Each public good p is produced by the government with technology
gp;t = e
p;txp;t. (2)
2006; Treisman 2007). In our framework, instead, centralization unambiguously alleviates moral hazard in
political agency.
2Appendix A provides a more complete discussion of the literature.
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The production technology has constant returns to scale: xp;t measures per-capita investment
in providing public good p. We rule out economies of scale in public-good provision, which
would provide an immediate technological rationale for centralization.
Productivity p;t represents the stochastic competence of the incumbent politician in
providing public good p. It follows a rst-order moving-average process
p;t = "p;t + "p;t 1. (3)
The shocks "p;t are independent and identically distributed across goods, over time and
across politicians. They have support ["; "^], mean zero and variance 2. Our preferred
interpretation is that parties are composed of overlapping generations of politicians. The
period-t government consists of older party leaders with competence "p;t 1 and young party
members with competence "p;t. At t+ 1, former party leaders retire, rising young politicians
take over the leadership, and a new cohort joins the party.
Politicians are self-interested rent seekers. Their objective is to maximize the present
value of the rents they can extract while in o¢ ce, discounted by the discount factor  2 (0; 1].
Each period, the government allocates a xed government budget b. The incumbent chooses
the amount xp;t of expenditure on each public good. He extracts as rent the reminder
rt = b 
PX
p=1
xp;t, (4)
which represents public resources devoted to socially unproductive projects.3
II.B. Elections and Information
The incumbent faces reelection at the end of each period. If ousted he will never return
to power. Politicians cannot make policy commitments, so the election is not based on
campaign promises but on retrospective evaluation of the incumbents track record. Voters
do not observe directly the incumbents competence nor his actions. Their inference is based
on an imperfect signal of public-good provision. The textbook model of career concerns
assumes that voters observe policy outcomes with additive noise. We assume instead that
voter information is binary. An informed voter observes perfectly the vector gt of realized
public goods. An uninformed voter receives no informative signal of gt, or proves completely
3Rent extraction could identically be interpreted as slacking (Seabright 1996; Alesina and Tabellini 2008).
Politicians enjoy an ego rent b from holding o¢ ce. However, they incur a cost xp;t from exerting e¤ort
to provide public goods. Then rt then captures politiciansfailure to work diligently in their constituents
interest.
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incapable of understanding information about gt.4
The electorate consists of a continuum of atomistic voters, partitioned into J groups.
Group j comprises a fraction j of voters, whose preferences are described by the vector j
of their ideal shares. The share of group-j members who are informed about public-good
provision is a random variable jt , independent and identically distributed over time. Our
model is robust to an arbitrary correlation of information across voters.5 We measure voter
information by the expected share of informed voters j = Ejt .
We allow for an intensive margin of political support, following the probabilistic voting
approach. Each voters preferences consist of two independent elements. First, agents have
preferences over the public goods they expect either politician (the incumbent I or the
challenger C) to provide in the following period. These preferences are summarized by the
di¤erence
i 
PX
p=1
ipEi
 
log gIp;t+1   log gCp;t+1

, (5)
where Ei denotes the rational expectation given voter is information. Second, voters have
preferences for candidatescharacteristics other than their competence: e.g., personal lika-
bility or party ideology. These preferences can be decomposed into an aggregate shock 	t
and an idiosyncratic shock  it that is independent and identically distributed across voters.
Voting is costless and all voters cast a ballot for their preferred candidate. Thus, voter
i votes for the incumbent if and only if i  	t +  it. As in Baron (1994) and Grossman
and Helpman (1996), informed voters cast their ballot based on observed policy outcomes,
while uninformed voters choose which candidate to support purely on the basis of preferences
unrelated to competence.6
The distribution of the shocks 	t and  
i
t is symmetric around zero, so voters do not favor
systematically incumbents or challengers. We assume that the two shocks are uniformly
distributed: 	t  U [ 1= (2) ; 1= (2)] and  it  U
  ;  . The support of preference
4Uninformed voters may not realize that public goods a¤ect their utility. Such ignorance is particularly
natural for public goods that yield long-run benets. Voters may also understand the benets of public
goods, but fail to understand how they depend on the incumbents actions and competence (Strömberg
2004).
5Most simply, information could be uncorrelated across voters. Each voter in group j has probability j
of being informed. Then in every period a share j of group members are informed. This assumption is
consistent with imperfect sharing of information within a group (Ponzetto 2011; Ponzetto and Troiano 2014).
First, agents privately acquire information. Some fail to observe gt. Second, agents communicate with a
nite number of neighbors. Some remain uninformed because none of their neighbors observed gt. If instead
information sharing is perfect, information is perfectly correlated within each group. With probability j
the entire group is informed (jt = 1), and with probability 1  j the entire group is uninformed (jt = 0).
6The standard assumption that uninformed voters vote sincerely could be attributed to their imperfect
rationality (Baron 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1996). It is also consistent with full strategic rationality
because a continuum of voters entails strategic insignicance: no voter can ever be pivotal.
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shocks is wide enough and the support of competence innovations "p;t narrow enough that
1
2
    " < "^     1
2
and   1
2
 " < "^  1
2
. (6)
The rst set of inequalities ensures that every voters ballot is imperfectly predictable, ir-
respective of gt. The second ensures that the outcome of the election is never entirely
predictable either.
The timeline within each period t is the following.
1. The incumbents past competence innovations "t 1 become common knowledge.
2. The incumbent chooses investments xt and rent rt.
3. The competence innovations "t are realized and the provision of public goods gt is
determined.
4. Voter information is realized: a share jt of members of group j perfectly observe gt.
The rest remain completely uninformed. No voter has any direct observation of "t, xt,
or rt.
5. An election is held, pitting the incumbent against a single challenger, randomly drawn
from the same pool of potential o¢ ce-holders.
II.C. Political Career Concerns
Voters rationally expect every politician to choose the stationary investment x. The equi-
librium allocation is time-invariant because the environment is stationary. It does not vary
with the incumbents observed skills "t 1 because performance is separable in e¤ort and
ability. It cannot vary with the competence innovations "t because they are unknown to the
politicians themselves when they make policy choices.7 Thus, the outcome of the election
a¤ects future public-good provision only through di¤erences in politiciansskills:
i =
PX
p=1
ipEi
 
p;t+1   Cp;t+1

=
PX
p=1
ipEi
 
"p;t   "Cp;t

=
PX
p=1
ipEi"p;t. (7)
7The agents lack of private information is the dening technical feature of career-concern models. A
more complicated signaling model in which politicians privately observe their own ability before choosing
their costly hidden action delivers the same qualitative results on incentives and screening in the political
agency problem (Banks and Sundaram 1998).
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No information exists about future competence innovations (either the incumbents "t+1
or the challengers "Ct+1), nor about the challengers current ability ("
C
t ). Thus, their expecta-
tion is nil for all voters. Uninformed voters cannot infer the incumbents ability from realized
public-good provision and retain the unconditional expectation E"p;t = 0.8 Informed voters,
instead, can infer the incumbents ability from their knowledge of public-good provision:
E ("p;tjgp;t) = log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1. (8)
In a rational-expectation equilibrium their inference is perfectly accurate (xp;t = xp entails
E ("p;tjgp;t) = "p;t).
From the politicians perspective, the probability of re-election as a function of his policy
choices is
 (xt) =
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp (log xp;t   log xp) , (9)
as we derive in Appendix C. The incumbent faces a trade o¤. Investing in public goods
reduces his rents but increases his chances of re-election by raising informed votersinference
of his ability. A politician who values re-election R chooses to extract rents
r = b  R
JX
j=1
jj. (10)
In a dynamic equilibrium, the value of re-election R is the expected present value of
future rents from holding o¢ ce. In a rational-expectation equilibrium voters cannot be
fooled (xp = xp;t). Then in every election the incumbent wins with probability  = 1=2.
Voter preferences are not exogenously biased in favor of incumbents or against them (the
distribution of 	t and  
i
t is symmetric around zero). An endogenous incumbency advantage
does not arise because politiciansability evolves as a rst-order moving-average process. 9
8We assume that uninformed voters vote sincerely based on their unconditional expectation because they
are strategically insignicant or imperfectly rational (Baron 1994; Grossman and Helpman 1996). With
a nite number of voters an uninformed voter with full strategic rationality would instead care about his
vote only when it is pivotal. In the limit as the number of voters diverges, uninformed voters would vote
strategically based on expected ability conditional on an exactly tied election. In the equilibrium of our
model, this conditional expectation remains Ei"p;t = 0 given that the aggregate taste shock 	t is uniformly
distributed on a su¢ ciently large support. Thus, we could identically assume that uninformed voters have
a pivotal-voting motivation provided they cannot infer the aggregate taste shock 	t from their own tastes
	t +  
i
t, either because the idiosyncratic shock is di¤use ( ! 1) or because their Bayesian reasoning is
imperfect.
9The impact of each competence shock lasts for two periods only, so past screening of incumbents does
not translate in a forward-looking electoral advantage as it does with longer-lasting competence shocks
(Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). If the period-t incumbent was re-elected at t  1 the expectation
of current productivity t is above average. Senior party leaders have proved their competence and won
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As a consequence, a politician who rationally anticipates extracting rent r whenever in o¢ ce
has an expected net present value of re-election
R = 
1X
t=0


2
t
r =
2
2   r. (11)
II.D. Government Accountability from Voter Information
Let   r=b 2 [0; 1] denote the fraction of the budget allocated to rents. The unique
stationary rational-expectation equilibrium has the following characterization.10
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, ruling politicians extract rents
 =
 
1 +
2
2  
JX
j=1
jj
! 1
and have expected ability
E^p;t = 2
JX
j=1
jpjj.
Rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of voter information (@=@j < 0 and
@2=@2j > 0). An increase in voter information j increases the ability of ruling politicians
^p;t in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Better information improves government accountability because it enables voters to mon-
itor politicians more closely. It alleviates both the moral-hazard problem of politiciansincen-
tives and the adverse-selection problem of politiciansselection. Voters can reward public-
good provision only when they perceive it accurately. As voter knowledge improves, the
incumbents performance more closely determines his chances of re-election. Ex ante, he ex-
tracts lower rents because his career concerns are heightened (@=@j < 0). Ex post, the aver-
age ability of ruling politicians rises because electoral screening improves (@E^p;t=@j > 0).11
re-election. However, their known ability "t 1 is orthogonal to future performance t+1 because they are
about to retire. A new cohort leades the party into the period-t election. Their skills "t can be inferred from
policy outcomes gt, but not from the past re-election of their retiring colleagues.
10All proofs are provided in Appendix C.
11Voters have no incentives to acquire information in order to improve governance because of the rational-
voter paradox. Each voter has a negligible likelihood of determining the outcome of the election. His
strategic incentives to become informed are likewise negligible. Therefore, information j reects exogenous
voter characteristics. E.g., education enables voters to grasp the precise role of politicians in providing public
goods; social capital reects civic involvement and the ability to share political knowledge in a wide social
network (Ponzetto and Troiano 2014).
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The key result in Lemma 1 is that rent extraction is decreasing but convex in voter
information (@2=@2j > 0).
12 Decreasing returns to monitoring follow from the dynamic
nature of the politiciansproblem. The direct impact of voter information on rent extraction
is linear (equation 10). For a given value of re-election R, more informed voters induce
one-to-one more investment and lower political rents. A transitory one-period increase in
voter information would have no other e¤ect, but a permanent increase in voter information
has an indirect e¤ect too. Politicians understand expect tighter monitoring if they are re-
elected, so the expected future rents from holding o¢ ce decrease. Their decline reduces
the incentives to refrain from extracting rents and mitigates the direct e¤ect of improved
monitoring. Current rent extraction is more sensitive to the expectation of future rents when
votersaverage information is higher. Thus, a marginal increase in votersinformation causes
a lower decline in rent extraction when the share of informed voters is higher to begin with.13
A large body of evidence conrms that the quality of government is higher if citizens are
more educated and politicians are subject to greater media scrutiny (e.g., Glaeser et al. 2004;
Svensson 2005; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). While none of these
studies have explored specically the concavity of this relationship, the data provide sug-
gestive empirical support for our prediction. Svenssons (2005) documents that low human
capital is the best predictor of high corruption across countries. Consistent with Lemma
1, Figure 1 shows that corruption is not only a decreasing but also a convex function of
the share of people with a tertiary education. A similar relationship emerges in Figure 2,
where we proxy information with newspaper circulation instead. Both results are robust to
controlling for income.14
12Other determinants of the quality of government are straightforward. More patient politicians are more
willing to reduce rent extraction in order to raise their chances of re-election (@=@ < 0). A higher variance
of politicians ability raises the gains from screening (@E^p;t=@2 > 0). Both incentives and screening
improve when voters are keener on competence than other determinants of political popularity (@=@ < 0
and @E^p;t=@ > 0).
13Extreme cases highlight decreasing returns to monitoring with particular clarity. If no voters are in-
formed, career concerns are absent and rent extraction is unchecked ( = 0 )  = 1). Introducing a
little monitoring induces a forceful reaction by politicians who are afraid of losing very large rents. If all
voters are informed, career concerns are at their strongest but rent-extraction cannot be reduced to zero
( = 1 )  > 0). Incumbents always extract some rents: only the appeal of future rents induces them to
make any productive investment. Marginally worsening perfect monitoring causes a small loss.
14The multivariate regressions are respectively l = 2:4
(:5)
  :23
(:06)
ln yl  26
(5)
l+ 82
(27)
2l + "l for education (across
118 countries) and l = 1:6
(:5)
  :11
(:07)
ln yl   12
(2)
l + 13
(3)
2l + "l for newspaper circulation (across 100 countries).
Corruption l 2 [ 2:5; 2:5] is the opposite of the Control of Corruption index from the World Governance
Indicators, averaging across available years (1996-2013). Real GDP per capita is from the Penn World Table
8.0, measured in 1970 following Svensson (2005). The share of people over 25 with a tertiary education is
from Barro and Lees dataset version 2.0, also measured in 1970. Newspaper circulation per capita is from
the World Development Indicators, averaging across available years (1997-2005).
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[FIGURES 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE]
Our nding that government accountability is an increasing but concave function of voter
information has a broader theoretical underpinning. The mechanism in Lemma 1 applies to
any determinant of electoral discipline. Information, however, has an additional source of
concavity: it can be shared by voters. The share jt of informed voters then results from
a two-stage process (Ponzetto 2011; Ponzetto and Troiano 2014). First, it includes those
who acquired information directly, for instance because they read newspapers or because
their human capital enables them to assess politiciansperformance accurately. Second, it
includes those who did not acquire information directly but obtained it from an informed
neighbor. Overall, the expected share of informed voters j is an increasing and concave
function of the probability that each voter acquires information directly, because one voters
knowledge has greater spillovers if his neighbors are less informed.15
III. Should Government Be Decentralized?
We turn now to our motivating question. Should di¤erent regions have di¤erent governments
whenever there are no spillovers, in accordance with Oatess (1972) classic Decentralization
Theorem? When can we expect decentralization to deliver the benets Alex Salmond touted
to Scotlands voters? When will centralization curb instead the graft and mismanagement
of local governments, as with welfare spending and the New Deal (Wallis, Fishback, and
Kantor 2006)? The key to our answer is that regions di¤er along several dimensions. They
have di¤erent preferences but also di¤erent levels of voter information.
We consider an economy composed of L regions, each populated by a unit measure of
voters. Preferences are homogeneous within each region, but heterogeneous across regions
(Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). E.g., residents of conservative red statesmay prefer greater
spending on defence, justice and police, while residents of progressive blue states may
prefer instead environmental protection, public education, and welfare spending. Our novel
contribution lies in studying at the same time di¤erences in voter information. E.g., states
with more educated residents have a higher expected share of informed voters, while voters
in less educated states are less likely to assess government performance accurately.
Formally, we assume that each regions preference vector l is an independent draw from
a distribution that is symmetric across goods, so the marginal distribution lp is the same for
15If each agent obtains information directly with probability j and shares it in a group of n neighbors,
his eventual probability of being informed is j = 1 
 
1  j
n
such that @j=@j > 0 > @
2j=@
2
j .
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all p and has mean Elp = 1=P .16 Then, preference heterogeneity can range between two limit
cases. It is nil when lp = 1=P deterministically. In this limit case of perfectly homogeneous
preferences, everyone desires the same uniform basket of public goods. At the opposite
extreme, preference heterogeneity is maximized when lp has a Bernoulli distribution with
Pr
 
lp = 1

= 1=P . In this limit case of maximum preference heterogeneity, each region
desires a single idiosyncratic public good, so the same good yields utility to two regions
with negligible probability 1=P . A series of mean-preserving spreads gradually spreads out
the distribution of preferences from the rst limit case to the second. We parametrize the
distribution of preferences by a homogeneity parameter  2 R+ such that the distribution
becomes less dispersed as  increases, spanning the whole feasible range. I.e., an increase
in  entails a mean-preserving contraction of lp. The limit case of maximum preference
heterogeneity corresponds to  = 0 and the limit case of perfectly homogeneous preferences
to  !1.17
Information is independent of preferences. Each regions expected share of informed
voters l is an independent draw from a distribution with mean El =  2 (0; 1). Then,
information heterogeneity can range between two limit cases. It is nil when l =  deter-
ministically. In this limit case of perfectly homogeneous information, every region has the
same expected share of informed voters. At the opposite extreme, information heterogeneity
is maximized when l has a Bernoulli distribution with Pr (l = 1) = . In this limit case of
maximum information heterogeneity, a fraction  of regions are perfectly informed (l = 1)
while the remainder 1   are completely uninformed (l = 0). A series of mean-preserving
spreads gradually spreads out the distribution of information from the rst limit case to the
second. We parametrize the distribution of information by a homogeneity parameter  2 R+
such that the distribution becomes less dispersed as  increases, spanning the whole feasible
range. I.e., an increase in  entails a mean-preserving contraction of l. The limit case of
maximum information heterogeneity corresponds to  = 0 and the limit case of perfectly
homogeneous information to !1.18
In a decentralized system, each region forms a separate constituency with a share of
informed voters l. It has an independent local government that allocates the regional
budget b. Local politicians with skills Dl;p;t invest in the provision of local public goods x
D
l;p;t
and extract rent rDl;t = b 
PP
p=1 x
D
l;p;t.
16We abstract from di¤erences between the sample distribution and the population distribution by con-
sidering the limit case of a continuum of regions.
17E.g., l could have a symmetric Dirichlet distribution on the regular (P   1)-simplex with concentration
parameter  > 0. Our results do not rely on this particular specication.
18E.g., l s B
 
;
 
1   could have a beta distribution with mean  and sample size (i.e., condence)
. Our results do not rely on this particular specication.
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Under centralization, instead, the central government is elected by a single unied con-
stituency whose share of informed voters equals the average across regions
PL
l=1 l=L. We
rule out economies of scale: the central-government budget equals the sum bL of the regional
budgets. Central politicians with skills Cp;t choose expenditures x
C
l;p;t for each public good
p in each region l and extract rent rCt = bL  
PL
l=1
PP
p=1 x
C
l;p;t. The central government
may be required to provide public goods uniformly across regions (gCl;p;t = g
C
p;t for all l),
either by a technological or by a constitutional constraint (Oates 1972; Alesina and Spo-
laore 2003). Conversely, it may be able to allocate spending across regions with complete
discretion (Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003).
Di¤erent government structures admit the following ranking in terms of aggregate social
welfare.
Proposition 1 Aggregate social welfare is higher under decentralization than under central-
ization without a uniformity constraint. It is highest under centralization with a uniformity
constraint if and only if preferences are su¢ ciently homogeneous (  ). Centralization is
more likely to be optimal when information is more heterogeneous ( is increasing in ) and
politiciansability less variable ( is increasing in ).
Centralization unambiguously reduces total rents when di¤erent regions have di¤erent
information. Merging heterogeneous regions creates a single polity whose level of voter
information equal the average across regions. Aggregate rent extraction declines because it
is a convex function of voter information, as established in Lemma 1:
1
L
LX
l=1
 (l)  
 
1
L
LX
l=1
l
!
. (12)
Nonetheless, centralization reduces welfare if the central government can operate without
a uniformity constraint that requires public goods to be provided identically in all regions.
O¢ ce-seeking politicians target government spending to the most politically inuential re-
gions. In our model, inuence stems from information. Absent a uniformity constraint,
central-government spending in di¤erent regions is proportional to voter information:PP
p=1 x
C
l;p;tPP
p=1 x
C
m;p;t
=
l
m
for all l and m. (13)
This equilibrium allocation features harmful regressive redistribution. Independent local
governments extract larger rents and provide fewer public goods in less informed regions.
Centralization without uniformity further reduces public-good provision in these regions,
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increasing it instead in better informed ones. Then, aggregate social welfare declines even
though the total provision of public goods rises as aggregate rent extraction falls.
On the contrary, with a uniformity constraint the decrease in rents is accompanied by
progressive redistribution that raises welfare further. Centralization slightly increases rent
extraction in better informed regions, but greatly reduces it in less informed ones, which have
a higher marginal utility of public goods because their local government is worse. Intuitively,
the uninformed gain from outsourcing government monitoring to better-informed voters in
other regions. The informed can also share in the accountability gains from centralization
if a uniformity constraint is imposed on some goods but not others. Then the uninformed
enjoy greater accountability in the provision of uniform public goods, and the informed enjoy
greater inuence over the provision of discretionary ones. Appendix B shows formally how
such partial uniformity can make centralization a Pareto improvement, albeit at the cost of
sacricing welfare maximization.19
The key result in Proposition 1 is that the welfare-maximizing government structure for
heterogeneous regions reects a trade o¤ between greater preference-matching under decen-
tralization and greater accountability under centralization. On the one hand, the central
government must be required to provide public goods uniformly, so centralization sacrices
the ability to tailor local public goods to local preferences. The more regions di¤er in their
ideal allocation, the greater the costs of political integration. Thus, preference heterogeneity
is a centrifugal force. On the other hand, rent extraction falls when the most informed re-
gions hold politicians accountable for everyone. The more regions di¤er in their monitoring
ability, the greater the benets of political integration. Thus, information heterogeneity is a
centripetal force.
If tastes are similar enough across regions, centralization maximizes welfare despite the
absence of externalities or economies of scale. Centralization is more likely to be optimal the
more information varies across regions. So long as information is not perfectly homogeneous,
it is optimal when preferences are similar but not identical ( is nite).
The nal result in Proposition 1 reects the cost of uniformity in government competence.
Under decentralization, each region selects to the best of its imperfect screening ability
ruling politicians who are most talented at providing those public goods the region nds most
important. The central government, instead, has average skills that try to satisfy all regions
but truly t none. When the variance of politiciansability is greater, so is the cost of such
19Public-good spillovers across regions are another force that can make centralization a Pareto improve-
ment. Appendix B shows that in our model the screening of politicians is better at the central than the local
level if there are externalities. Furthermore, we provide a political-agency microfoundation for the classic
assumption that decentralization distorts the budget allocation for spillover-generating public goods (Oates
1972).
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uniformity. Then, centralization becomes less appealing because it distorts the allocation of
talent but has no impact on average screening:
PX
p=1
E^Cp = 2 =
1
L
LX
l=1
PX
p=1
E^Dl;p. (14)
This invariance, however, follows from the assumption that voter information about pub-
lic goods is independent of the level of government that provides them. This assumption is
realistic to the extent that voter knowledge reects individual characteristics such as human
capital, social capital, or civic engagement. Yet, voter information also reects di¤erences in
media coverage, which plausibly varies with political integration. In particular, the media
are more likely to report on centralized policies because they concern a broader audience
(Gentzkow 2006; Snyder and Strömberg 2010). Such an increase in reporting would entail
additional e¢ ciency gains from centralization, through better selection as well as better in-
centives (Glaeser and Ponzetto 2014). Then, greater variance in politiciansability might
make political integration more appealing, rather than less.
Do the theoretical results in Proposition 1 have counterparts in the real world? We
certainly cannot prove empirically whether the European Union or an increasing federal
share of U.S. government spending is good or bad. There is, however, evidence supporting
the key points in our model: discretionary spending by the central government can short-
change less informed groups; decentralized control has often been associated with corruption
and limited political accountability; the benets of centralization are often greater for less
informed populations; and decentralization has been more successful where accountability
varies less across regions.
Strömberg (2004) studies the allocation of discretionary government spending during
the New Deal and documents that state governors favored counties with a greater share of
radio listeners, and so with better informed voters. If we accept his identifying assumption
that ground connectivity and woodland cover have no direct e¤ect on the e¤ectiveness of
government expenditure, it follows that voter information alone is driving these di¤erences
in public spending across space. The tendency of discretionary spending to follow knowledge
is precisely why Proposition 1 nds that discretion is bad.
The downsides of discretion may also explain why uniformity is common in many gov-
ernment policies. It may seem counter-intuitive that U.S. federal housing policy should
o¤er similar subsidies to building in areas where supply is constrained, like New York City,
and areas where supply seems almost unlimited, like Houston. One explanation for spatial
uniformity is that the tendency of locational discretion to harm particular regions is well
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understood.
The fundamental downside of decentralization in our model is that it leads to less ac-
countability and more corruption. We know of no studies that clearly illustrate the relative
corruption of national versus local governments in the United States and Europe. How-
ever, the history of Americas state and city governments is consistent with our theoretical
prediction.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the governments of large American cities were in-
famous for their corruption. New Yorks Boss Tweedand his formidable Tammany Hall
machine live on in popular memory as epitomes of organized graft in local government.20
Other cities had equally corrupt administrations a major theme of the progressive move-
ment (Ste¤ens 1904).21 This urban experience was very far from Tiebouts (1956) and Oatess
(1972) vision of local governments responding tightly to the desires of their residents.
Federal intervention eradicated the corrupt manipulation that had characterized U.S.
local politics, at least in the context of welfare spending. Until the Great Depression, poverty
relief managed by states and localities was a byword for patronage and graft. The NewDeal
the most dramatic episode of centralization in the history of the United States introduced
strict federal oversight of welfare programs. One consequence was a striking decrease in
corruption (Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006).
While city politics cleaned up after the New Deal, state governments remained notorious
for corruption (Wilson 1966). Since the Second World War, ten governors and nine members
of state executives have been convicted for o¢ cial corruption and sentenced to jail. No mem-
ber of the federal cabinet, let alone a president, has been charged with crimes investigated
as part of the federal prosecution of public corruption.
Contemporary cross-country studies have yielded conicting and inconclusive results on
the relationship between decentralization and corruption (Treisman 2007). Historical evi-
dence from around the world, however, shows that political integration often had a positive
impact on government accountability. Centralized political institutions in precolonial Africa
reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law. They caused a long-lasting increase in the
provision of public goods that endured into the postcolonial period (Gennaioli and Rainer
2007). Fiscal centralization was a key element in the modernization of European states. It
20The New York County Courthouse, better known as the Tweed Courthouse, became a veritable monu-
ment to corruption. Its construction took over twenty years and cost $12 million, with overbilling of comical
proportions. A Tammany ring member was paid $133,187 (around $2 million in present-day terms) for two
dayswork as a plasterer.
21Chicagos street railways are another infamous case. The city council granted exclusive franchises on
such favorable terms that in 1893 the entire system returned a mere $50,000 to the city. Instead, traction
magnate Charles Yerkes spent $1 million in bribes to get through the state legislature a law enabling Chicago
aldermen to grant franchises for no less than fty years and without any compensation to the city.
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proved a necessary step for the consolidation of state capacity, which was in turn a criti-
cal determinant of economic and political development (Besley and Persson 2011; Dincecco
2011). Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argue that China grew faster than Russia in recent
decades thanks to the greater strength of its central government vis à vis local politicians.
Proposition 1 predicts not only that centralization should reduce rent extraction, but
that these accountability benets should ow mostly to the least informed regions, as long
as the central government enacts a uniform policy. Empirical evidence on reforms to public
education systems bears out this prediction. In the early 1990s, Argentina transferred control
of federal secondary schools to provincial governments. Student test scores rose in richer
municipalities, but failed to rise or even fell in poor ones (Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky
2008). Decentralization increased inequality and harmed those already disadvantaged. A
1998 university reform in Italy transferred responsibility for faculty hiring from the national
ministry to individual universities. Faculty hires became signicantly more nepotistic in
provinces with low newspaper readership. Those with higher readership experienced at best
a marginal improvement (Durante, Labartino, and Perotti 2014). Decentralization worsened
the quality of academic recruitment and hurt the least informed regions the most.
Environmental policy in the United States also provides suggestive support for our theo-
retical prediction. The Clean Air Act of 1970 transferred responsibility for pollution regula-
tion from the state and local governments to the federal Environmental Protection Agency.
Relative to pre-existing trends, pollutant emissions began to decline considerably faster in
states with lower newspaper circulation (we provide a formal di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis
in Bo¤a, Piolatto and Ponzetto [2014]).
The conclusion of Proposition 1 is that decentralization is desirable only if accountability
is relatively homogeneous across regions. Our nding is consistent with historical evidence
on the formation of unied nation-states in Germany and Italy. Both countries were unied
in the second half of the nineteenth century: the Kingdom of Italy was established in 1861
and the German Empire in 1871. Before unication, Germany comprised many modern
and well-functioning states. In Italy, the quality of pre-unitary institutions was lower and
more heterogeneous. The Kingdom of Sardinia, which led the process of unication, could
be considered the only e¢ cient modern state. Consistent with our theory, these di¤erent
patterns of institutional quality before unication can explain why Germany was conceived
as a federal nation-state and Italy as a unitary one (Ziblatt 2006). Remarkably, both the
degree of centralization and the underlying di¤erences in accountability have remained larger
in Italy than in Germany up to the present day excepting the tragic parenthesis of German
centralization under Nazism.
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IV. HowMany Levels of Government Should There
Be?
The classic theory of scal federalism studies which functions and instruments are best
centralized and which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government
(Oates 1999, p. 1120). This standard approach suggests that there should be as many
levels of government as there are geographic units a function is optimally tied to. Evidence
from local governments in the United States, however, paints a di¤erent picture. Special-
purpose districts managing individual public services for di¤erent and overlapping areas have
performed poorly in terms of e¢ ciency and accountability (Berry 2009). In this section, we
explain why the proliferation of government tiers can harm welfare and we study when it
is optimal to create a federal structure in which some policy decisions are centralized and
other decentralized.
We assume the same distribution of voter information as in Proposition 1, with mean
 and a homogeneity parameter . However, we now consider two kinds of public goods
at the opposite extremes of preference heterogeneity. First, there is a set of public goods
for which all regions have perfectly homogeneous preferences ( ! 1). By Proposition 1,
these public goods would best be provided by a central government if there were no other
policy choices. For the second set of public goods, preferences are completely idiosyncratic
( = 0 and P !1). Each region benets exclusively from its own ideal variety, and derives
no utility at all from any of the L   1 ideal varieties of the other regions. Absent other
policies, Proposition 1 established that these idiosyncratic public goods should be provided
by decentralized local governments. With both types of public goods, a resident i of region
l has utility
uit = ~u
i
t + 0 log gl;0;t + (1  0) log gl;l;t, (15)
where g0 is a composite bundle of all the homogeneously desired public goods, while gl is
region ls desired variety of idiosyncratic public goods. The ideal share 0 2 (0; 1) provides
a measure of preference homogeneity in this setting.
The structure of government is described by an allocation of powers and budgets to the
two levels of government, local and central. As before, full decentralization means that each
local government provides the residents of its region l with both the homogeneously desired
public goods (gl;0) and their ideal variety of idiosyncratic public goods (gl;l). Conversely, the
government is fully centralized if the central government is tasked with providing all public
goods to residents of all regions.
An intermediate possibility is the creation of a federal system. The central government
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provides homogeneously desired public goods (gl;0) to all regions, while every region has
its own local government provide the idiosyncratic public good gl;l.22 The overall budget
remains exogenously xed at Lb. Consistent with our focus on expenditures, we assume that
all regions must contribute equally to the central-government budget. Its size bC then su¢ ces
to characterize the budget allocation. Local-government budgets are determined residually
as bD = b  bC=L for every region.
The central government may be required to provide any public good uniformly. The uni-
formity constraint is imposed independently on each good. It may apply to some goods and
not others. It may not, however, apply to an aggregate of goods. This restriction is imme-
diate for a technological constraint because every good is distinct. The aggregate amount of
public goods provided to a region (
PL
p=0 gl;p;t) cannot be constrained constitutionally either.
The quantities of di¤erent goods cannot be properly compared by an impartial auditor, so
it is unfeasible to require the provision of separate but equal public goods to di¤erent
regions.
The welfare-maximizing structure of government admits the following characterization.
Proposition 2 A federal system is optimal if di¤erences in voter information are large
enough ( < ) while di¤erences in preferences are neither too small nor too large (0 2
(DF ; FC)). A federal system is more likely to be optimal when information is more
heterogeneous (DF is increasing and FC decreasing in ) and politiciansability more
variable ( is increasing in  and @FC=@ > @DF=@ = 0).
Full centralization is optimal if di¤erences in preferences are small ( <  and 0 
FC, or    and 0  DC). Full decentralization is optimal if di¤erences in preferences
are large ( <  and 0  DF , or    and 0 < DC). Full centralization is less likely
to be optimal when politiciansability is more variable (@DC=@ > 0).
Our model of accountability reverses the standard logic of scal federalism. The existence
of some policy instruments that are best centralized and some others that are best decen-
tralized does not immediately imply that the government should be structured on federal
lines. On the contrary, if regional di¤erences in voter information are negligible it is optimal
to have a single level of government: either only a central government, or only independent
local governments. This key result reects endogenous economies of scope in government
accountability.
Politicians with little power have low-powered incentives. They control a smaller budget,
so they have a lower value of holding o¢ ce. Moreover, their skills have a lower impact on
22A federal system with the opposite allocation of powers is theoretically possible but intuitively undesir-
able. We prove in Appendix C that it can never be welfare-maximizing.
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votersutility, so other factors are more likely to determine their re-election. As a result,
their career concerns are weaker. In equilibrium, incumbents have incentives to demonstrate
each skill in proportion to its welfare value. E.g., a politician tasked with providing g0 to
voters with average information  invests x0 = 0R if he values re-election R. Crucially,
the equilibrium value of re-election is proportional to the budget a politician controls. Then
there are no economies of scale across regions: halving both the budget and the population
served leads to invariant spending per capita. Instead, there are economies of scope across
goods: halving both the budget and the set of public goods provided leads to lower spending
on each good and a higher share of the budget dissipated as rents.
Centralization minimizes aggregate rent extraction because it exploits both these economies
of scope and the e¢ ciency benets of delegating government monitoring to the best monitors.
As in Proposition 1, however, the central government fails to match idiosyncratic local needs.
Under full centralization, each region unavoidably receives its ideal variety of idiosyncratic
public goods in proportion to its residentsinformation:
xCl;l;t
xCm;m;t
=
l
m
for all l and m. (16)
The optimal provision of homogeneously desired public goods is uniform across regions, so
a uniformity constraint su¢ ces to ensure it. On the contrary, requiring uniform provision of
idiosyncratic public goods only makes misallocation worse. The central government keeps
catering disproportionately to the preferences of the informed, but it has to provide their
ideal variety to other regions that derive no benet from it. This uniformity constraint is so
wasteful it makes every region worse o¤ than discretionary central provision of idiosyncratic
public goods.
Preference heterogeneity then has a natural e¤ect on the optimal structure of government.
If preferences are highly idiosyncratic, decentralization is optimal because local governments
are best at preference-matching. If preferences are highly homogeneous, centralization is
optimal because only rent-minimization matters. In both extreme cases, one class of public
goods is marginal, so it is worth sacricing its optimal provision in order to exploit economies
of scope and raise accountability in the provision of the dominant public goods.
When preference heterogeneity is intermediate, both idiosyncratic and homogeneously
desired public goods are important. The key result in Proposition 2 is that a federal sys-
tem is then optimal if and only if di¤erences in voter information across regions are large
enough. When the information gap is larger, uninformed regions gain more from delegating
monitoring to informed ones. Hence, there are greater benets from having a central gov-
ernment provide homogeneously desired public goods (DF is increasing in  ). Greater
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heterogeneity also implies that uninformed regions lose more from ceding power to informed
ones. Thus, there are greater costs of having the central government provide idiosyncratic
public goods too (FC is decreasing in ).
When di¤erences in voter information are large, it is worth sacricing economies of scope
to reap the large benets of a progressive transfer of accountability without paying the large
costs of a regressive transfer of power. Figure 3 represents graphically the optimal structure
of government. The larger the di¤erence in information, the larger the region F in which a
federal system is optimal.
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
As in Proposition 1, a downside of centralization is the uniformity of central politicians
skills. Thus, greater variation in the pool of political talent reduces the appeal of full
centralization. As a consequence, not only decentralization but also a federal system become
more attractive.23
Proposition 2 established that multiple levels of government come at the cost of re-
duced government e¢ ciency and accountability, even if they may be desirable for preference-
matching and distributive reasons. The experience of local government in the United States
bears out empirically our prediction. Many states have overlapping layers of county govern-
ments, municipal governments, and multiple special-purpose governments, such as elected
school districts and independent districts managing specic public utilities. The performance
record of special-purpose governments has been disappointing and they have proved prone
to capture by special interests (Berry 2009). The employees of the special-purpose district
are often the key voting block in its elections. Public libraries provide a telling example
of systematic ine¢ ciency. When they are run by directly elected special-purpose library
districts they have larger budgets, but neither more visitors nor higher circulation. On the
contrary, they hold fewer books and fewer of their employees are actually librarians.
Evidence from Europe conrms that multiplying government tiers has detrimental e¤ects.
In England, local government most commonly has two levels: counties and districts. A
sizeable minority of areas are governed instead by a unitary authority entrusted with all
local-government tasks. Unitary authorities are more e¢ cient, particularly because the two-
tier structure is linked to lower labor productivity and excess employment (Andrews and
Boyne 2009).
France has three nested tiers of sub-national governments (regions, departments and
municipalities) plus various associations of municipalities. This complex and multi-layered
23In Figure 3, the continuous locus 0 = max fFC ; DCg shifts up and so does its intersection  with
the locus 0 = DF .
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structure has been a source of ine¢ ciency and institutional weakness, especially at inter-
mediate levels (Le Galès and John 1997). In its two latest reports on local government
nances, the French Court of Auditors stresses that the proliferation of sub-national gov-
ernment tiers determines unproductive public employment. It also highlights inadequate
governance mechanisms and advocates intervention by the national parliament to set di-
rectly goals and standards for local governments. Pruning the local-government structure
is on the French governments agenda. The Attali Commission recommended abolishing
the departmental tier within ten years. President Hollande has proposed abolishing elected
departmental councils by 2020.
In Germany, since 2000 three states (Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt and Lower
Saxony) have abolished one level of local government. Italy abolished elected provincial coun-
cils in 2014, and the government has proposed a constitutional reform to abolish provinces
altogether. Italys three-tier subnational structure (regions, provinces and municipalities) is
widely recognized as ine¢ cient: it was arguably designed specically as a way for political
parties to provide patronage and sinecures (Dente 1988).
Cross-country evidence also supports the predictions of Proposition 2. In countries with
more levels of government rms report having to pay more frequent and costlier bribes. This
positive correlation between corruption and the number of government tiers is particularly
robust, and its magnitude is a rst-order concern for developing countries. Fan, Lin and
Treisman (2009, p. 32) conclude that [o]ther things equal, in a country with six tiers of
government (such as Uganda) the probability that rms reported neverbeing expected to
pay bribes was :32 lower than the same probability in a country with two tiers (such as
Slovenia).
While there is clear evidence that the multiplication of government tiers dilutes account-
ability, we know of no equally clear evidence on the distributive benets of federalism.
Nonetheless, the pattern of political discourse in the United States is suggestively consistent
with our theoretical prediction that the least informed regions benet the most from a fed-
eral structure relative to either unitary alternative. On average, Southern states have less
educated voters and lower newspaper readership. They also have more corrupt governments
(Glaeser and Saks 2006). The distributive predictions of our model can then help explain
why the South is at the same time particularly patriotic e.g., it provides a disproportionate
share of U.S. military personnel but also keenest on curbing the expansion of federal power
and preserving the statesindependent policy-making responsibilities.
When neither full centralization nor full decentralization is optimal, we can characterize
the precise structure of the optimal federal system.
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Corollary 1 In the optimal federal system, the budget, productivity and accountability of
the central government are lower when di¤erences in preferences are larger (@bC=@0 > 0,
@E^C0 =@0 > 0 and @C=@0 < 0).
The budget, productivity and accountability of local governments are higher when di¤er-
ences in preferences are larger (@bD=@0 < 0, @E^
D
l;l=@0 < 0 and @
D
l =@0 > 0). Rent
extraction by local governments increases with di¤erences in information (
PL
l=1 
D
l =L is de-
creasing in ).
Overall rent extraction increases with di¤erences in information. It is a concave function
of preference heterogeneity and it reaches a maximum at the value 0 2 (0; 1=2) for which
local governments have on average the same accountability as the central government (0 =
0 , C =
PL
l=1 
D
l =L). The di¤erence in preferences associated with maximum rents
increases with di¤erences in information (0 is increasing in ).
The comparative statics on each level of government highlight the fundamental strength
of a federal system. Resources ow to the level of government where they are most useful.
All regions prefer the unique e¢ cient budget allocation that gives each level of government
resources proportional to the ideal share of the public good it is responsible for providing:
bC = 0bL and b

D = (1  0) b. (17)
Voter monitoring of politicians obeys a similar equilibrium allocation. Screening for compe-
tence is proportional to the welfare weight of the public goods each politician is in charge of
providing:
E^C0 = 02 and E^
D
l;l = (1  0)2l. (18)
Hence, incentives improve and rent extraction declines when a politician has more important
responsibilities:
C =

1 + 20 (2  ) 1 
 1
and Dl =

1 + 2 (1  0)  (2  ) 1 l
 1
, (19)
such that @C=@0 < 0 < @Dl =@0.
Aggregate rent extraction is lowest when one level of government accounts for most
public-good provision, so it controls most of the budget and it is also the main focus of
voter monitoring. Then total rents are low because one level of government is large and
accountable, while the other is relatively unaccountable but small. By Proposition 2, when
this logic (and the value of 0) is brought to an extreme, a federal structure becomes undesir-
able: the small and unaccountable level of government is best abolished. Hence, Proposition
1 highlights the second-best nature of the optimal government structure. Federalism is
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welfare-maximizing for intermediate values of 0, but total rents are then larger too.
Intuitively, rent extraction is highest when both levels of government are equally account-
able (C = EDl ). Then, if either grew more important it would both control a larger budget
share and extract proportionally fewer rents from it. Rents are largest when the central
government is smaller than the local ones (0 < 1=2). This is a natural consequence of
greater accountability at the central level in the presence of heterogeneous information. As
di¤erences in voter information grow larger, so does the ine¢ ciency of local governments,
and thus of a federal system that includes them. Accordingly, the peak of rent extraction is
associated with a greater importance of local governments.
V. What Should Determine the Boundaries of Gov-
ernments?
Government structure is not entirely described by the number of tiers. The size of sub-
national jurisdictions can also vary. Is it better to have few large local governments or
many small ones? Our model can be applied directly to study the optimal boundaries
of governments. Proposition 1 considered a simple symmetric setting in which either all
regions should integrate or each should have its independent government. The intuition
generalizes to asymmetric cases. Regional boundaries should be drawn so that people with
similar preferences but di¤erent information share a government, while those with di¤erent
preferences but similar information do not.
In this section we extend our model by relaxing the assumption that voters are sorted into
geographic regions with internally homogeneous preferences. To study optimal boundaries
when ideological groups do not naturally coincide with geographic regions, we assume a
simple two-fold partition of voters by ideology and information.
Voters have ideological preferences for two distinct public goods L and R. Left-wingers
desire the former and have utility uiL;t = ~u
i
t + log gl;L;t. Right-wingers desire the latter and
have utility uiR;t = ~u
i
t + log gl;R;t. This simple preference structure provides a stylized model
of local government consistent with Proposition 2. Preferences over locally provided public
goods are highly heterogeneous because public goods that all voters desire homogeneously
should be provided by the federal government instead.
Each ideological group comprises voters with di¤erent levels of information. Better in-
formed voters succeed at inferring the incumbents competence from realized policy out-
comes with probability I . Relatively uninformed voters have a lower probability of learning
U < I .
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A country is then characterized by the sizes of the four groups L;I , L;U , R;I and R;U .
We consider partitions of this overall population into autonomous regions or federal states.
Each region is endowed with a budget of b units per resident, so there are no economies of
scale. Moreover, a region is the minimal administrative unit, so the regional government
is subject to a technological uniformity constraint: it cannot di¤erentiate the provision of
public goods across residents.
We begin by characterizing the optimal regional structure when there are no constraints
on how citizens can be partitioned into regions.
Proposition 3 Optimal regions are perfectly separated by preferences and perfectly mixed
by information (every region l has either l;L;I = l;L;U = 0 and l;R;I=l;R;U = R;I=R;U , or
l;R;I = l;R;U = 0 and l;L;I=l;L;U = L;I=L;U).
Without exogenous constraints, the optimal partition resolves intuitively the two forces
highlighted by Proposition 1. Preference heterogeneity is a centrifugal force that can be ac-
commodated by separating groups with di¤erent ideal allocations. Such optimal segregation
reects Tiebouts (1956) classic intuition. It is typically optimal when there are no economies
of scale and no constraints on creating as many regions as there are desired bundles of public
goods (Bewley 1981). The novelty of our model lies in the centripetal force caused by di¤er-
ences in information. A partition that achieves homogeneous preferences within each region
can nonetheless be suboptimal. Optimality also requires the perfect mixing of like-minded
voters with di¤erent levels of information. Citizens su¤er from sharing a government with
others with opposite preferences who cause a distributional conict. They su¤er no less
from being cut o¤ from better-informed voters with the same preferences, whose inuence is
necessary to keep the local government accountable.
Proposition 3 highlights that an ideologically homogeneous but uniformly ill-informed re-
gion is plagued by bad governance. Its government reects the preferences of local residents,
but it is also unaccountable, ine¢ cient and corrupt. This prediction of our model is consistent
with evidence from local governments in the United States. City politicians have at times
succeeded in creating large local majorities of their poorer and less educated supporters by
encouraging the out-migration of a rival higher-status group. The detrimental consequences
of his process are best illustrated by the long career of Boston mayor James Michael Cur-
ley (Glaeser and Shleifer 2005). Both his policies and his stark rhetoric championed the
poor Irish community against the richer Anglo-Saxon Protestants that had previously dom-
inated the city. The end of Brahmin dominance pleased Bostons Irish and removed the
discrimination they had su¤ered from. However, Curleys administration was ine¢ cient and
corrupt; Boston declined under his government. Similar patterns emerge in other cases of
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populist local politics catering to particular ethnic and socioeconomic constituencies, such
as African-Americans in Detroit under Coleman Young.
The optimal partition described by Proposition 3 has two contrasting features. Ten-
sion between the two can entail a welfare loss when groups with di¤erent preferences are
separated. Proposition 1 characterized one set of circumstances leading to this outcome.
When voterspreferences are not completely distinct, separation is undesirable if di¤erences
in voter information are large enough. Another possibility is that perfect separation à la
Tiebout is technologically impossible because residents with di¤erent preferences are mixed
in a narrow area such as a city or county. If perfect separation is impossible, is partial
separation desirable, or is it even worse than perfect integration?
Consider two symmetric atomistic locations. Their total population is identical, but the
rst location has a majority of left-wing residents and the second a majority of right-wing
residents. The distribution of the population is characterized by a degree of ideological
sorting  2 (0; 1) such that
1;L = 2;R =
1 + 
4
and 1;R = 2;L =
1  
4
. (20)
In the limit as  ! 0 residents with di¤erent preferences are perfectly mixed, while in the
limit as  ! 1 there is perfect sorting.
Voter information is also symmetric, but not homogeneous across locations. Voters with
either preferences have an average probability  of being informed in the location in which
they belong to the majority. In the location where they are a minority, their information
is reduced to  (1  ) for a coe¢ cient  2 (0; 1) of information disadvantage. The lower
information of the minority reects endogenous media slant (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010).
Local media choose an ideological bias to match the preferences of the local majority. As a
consequence, news consumption becomes more appealing for the majority and less for the
minority.
The following result characterizes formally whether political integration or partial sepa-
ration is optimal when perfect segregation by preferences is impossible.
Proposition 4 Aggregate social welfare is higher under political integration than under
separation if minorities su¤er from a high information disadvantage (  ). Integration is
more likely to be optimal when ideological sorting is less complete (@=@ > 0) and politicians
ability less variable (@=@ > 0).
Intra-regional heterogeneity entails a new trade o¤. The centripetal force is information
heterogeneity of a di¤erent kind than the one underlying Proposition 1. In Proposition 4
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there are no di¤erences in average information across regions, so aggregate rent extraction
is invariant. There are, however, di¤erences in information between the majority and the
minority within each location. Under separation, uninformed minorities are dominated by
better informed local majorities. Political integration restores even power to the two ideo-
logical groups. Each uninformed minority gains political inuence thanks to the like-minded
informed majority in the other location. Thus, political integration can raise welfare even if
the e¢ ciency gains from delegated monitoring are absent.
These distributive welfare gains are monotone increasing in the information disadvantage
of the minority. If information is homogeneous, separation is the constrained optimum
( > 0). Imperfect ideological segregation remains costly, and minorities bear a greater
share of this cost. Yet, political integration merely worsens overall preference matching. At
the opposite extreme, if a minority is completely uninformed it is essentially disenfranchised.
Then utilitarian welfare maximization requires political integration to protect the minority
( < 1 for all  < 1).
Ideological sorting provides a countervailing centrifugal force. As groups with opposite
preferences are more and more segregated, the di¤erence in preferences across regions in-
creases and so does the appeal of political separation. In the limit, political separation
is always optimal if ideological sorting is complete, as Proposition 3 already established
(lim!1  = 1). Finally, as in Proposition 1, greater variance in politiciansability makes
integration less attractive because of distortions in the allocation of talent.24
Our results speak directly to proposals for the partition of California, which have been put
forward several times most recently, venture capitalist Tim Draper attempted to introduce
for 2016 a ballot initiative to split the state in six. By far the largest state in the union,
California is composed of several distinct regions. The most salient political divide is between
East and West. The di¤erences are both partisan and ideological: Western California is more
liberal, even among Republican voters and politicians; Eastern California considerably more
conservative (Kousser 2009). At a rst glance, such a political divide might suggest that a
break up of coastal and inland California would be optimal on preference-matching grounds.
Proposition 4, however, cautions against this supercial assessment. Both the southeast-
ern Inland Empire and the San Joaquin Valley contain a large Hispanic population that
overwhelmingly prefers the Democratic party. This group is much less educated, less politi-
cally knowledgeable, and less likely to vote than Republican supporters in the region, who are
24The e¤ect of political integration on screening would be opposite if majorities were systematically less
informed than minorities. Aside from comparative statics, however, the trade o¤ presented by Proposition
4 remains in this less intuitive case. If an uninformed local majority is dominated by an informed minority,
a fortiori political integration has the benet of equalizing the power of the two groups. It raises welfare if
and only if sorting is su¢ ciently imperfect.
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on average older, whiter, and wealthier.25 At the same time, the left-wing Hispanic working
class in the Valley shares the political leanings of highly educated liberals on the coast. This
ideological alignment goes beyond mere partisanship and includes shared preferences over
policies: whether they ride in limousines, Volvos, or buses, Democrats in the blue areas of
the state share similar policy views(Kousser 2009, p. 2).
As a consequence, our model suggests that the political integration of California is welfare
maximizing. For relatively uneducated inland minorities to have a government corresponding
to their preferences, it is essential that they share a state with ideologically aligned liberal
elites in the Bay area. Right-wing Californians, instead, are su¢ ciently educated and inu-
ential to have a voice in state-wide politics, despite being in the minority: California had a
Republican governor for twenty-one of the past thirty years.
The lesson of Proposition 4 applies more broadly. Disadvantaged ethnic minorities
which are less educated and often politically underrepresented should belong whenever
possible to the same polity as better educated and higher-status voters having similar political
preferences. Only then are politicians e¤ectively held accountable to both groups.
VI. Conclusion
Is government decentralization the right answer to di¤erences across regions? The idea has
gained wide currency, from European Union law enshrining the principle of subsidiarity to
independence movements in Québec, Scotland or Catalonia and recurring proposals to split
California into separate liberal and conservative states. The classic theory of scal federalism
supports and formalizes the intuitive appeal of this notion: according to Oatess (1972) semi-
nal Decentralization Theorem, decentralization is more e¢ cient than centralization whenever
regions are not identical and there are no policy spillovers.
This paper o¤ers a di¤erent perspective by focusing on a key overlooked dimension of
regional heterogeneity: votersability to monitor politicians and hold them accountable. Our
model explains why decentralization has often failed to deliver the accountability benets
anticipated by its proponents, and why it is more suitable for countries with homogeneous
institutional quality, like Germany, than countries with gaping regional disparities, like Italy.
When voter information varies across regions, centralization yields accountability gains. The
central government is monitored mainly by the most informed regions and as result it has
better incentives than the average local government. At the same time, however, its incen-
tives are to serve the informed and neglect the uninformed, so it must be forced to provide
25Hispanic immigrants are also more likely not to have the right to vote, but a substantial majority of
hispanic residents of southeastern California are U.S. citizens.
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at least some public goods uniformly in order to avoid unacceptable distributive distortions.
The same force thus drives both sides of a trade o¤: preference heterogeneity prompts de-
centralization, but information heterogeneity prompts centralization instead.
As a result, the borders of governments should not reect only the classic Tiebout (1956)
logic of sorting by preferences. It is also crucial to ensure diversity of information because
uninformed voters are caught between the hammer of unaccountable politicians and the anvil
of better informed voters with contrasting policy priorities. The solution is for them to share
a government with highly informed voters with similar tastes. Thus, California should not
be broken up: the benets of separating the liberal local majority on the coast from the
conservative local majority inland seem smaller than those of grouping together the coastal
liberal elite with the working-class left-wing minority in the Central Valley.
Our analysis hints that the main problem with state boundaries in the United States
is not that states like California are too big and diverse, but on the contrary that many
states are too small. In our theory, the costs and benets of fragmentation are driven by
observables: respectively di¤erences in voter information and in political preferences. As
a rst step in bringing our model to the data, we computed a rough estimate of the net
benets from merging any pair of contiguous American states. We proxied the share of
informed voters by that of college graduates, and preferences by presidential vote shares.
This simple quantitative exercise suggests that merging the smallest states in the North-
East (Delaware, Rhode Island, Vermont) and in the Mountain West (Idaho, Wyoming) with
their larger neighbors would yield e¢ ciency gains at a negligible cost in terms of preference-
matching. Re-uniting Virginia and West Virginia seems most attractive: the two states have
very similar party vote shares, but very di¤erent levels of human capital. Our rough estimate
of the welfare gains from a merger has the same order of magnitude as a permanent increase
in the annual growth rate of real income per capita by 10 basis points.26
Our framework also o¤ers new insights on federal systems with multiples level of gov-
ernment. The standard logic of scal federalism suggests there should be many government
layers, so that every policy instrument is tied to its optimal geographic unit. Instead, our
theory shows economies of scope in government accountability. A unitary government that
controls a large budget and multiple policy instruments su¤ers less from moral hazard than
many special-purpose governments, each controlling a specic policy and its separate budget.
Our model thus explains why the multiplication of government tiers is empirically associated
with ine¢ ciency and poor accountability.
Furthermore, we have found that a federal structure can be desirable only if information
heterogeneity is large enough. This result sounds a note of caution against the embrace
26The full details of our quantitative exercise are available on request.
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of federalism as an answer to independentist movements. Devolution has so far been the
preferred strategy in Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. However, if English and
Scottish voters are equally good at monitoring government performance but prefer di¤erent
government agenda, our model suggest that British federalism could be an inferior alternative
either to the old model of centralization in Westminster or to full Scottish independence.
Conversely, our analysis shines a positive light on the European Union. Stark di¤erences
in institutional quality across member states are perceived as a major problem since the start
of the Euro crisis. How can the Union include both virtuous corecountries like Germany,
the Netherlands, or Finland, and the troubled Euro peripheryof Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain? Our model shows that such di¤erences in government accountability are in fact
a motivating strength of the European project. They explain why we can expect e¢ ciency
gains from transferring powers to EU institutions, but also why substantial policy choices
should remain at the national level.
In this paper we have developed a theoretical framework rather than focusing on concrete
policy instruments, but the allocation of specic policies to di¤erent levels of government is
clearly an important topic for future research. In this context, our theory may help explain an
enduring puzzle: why the European Union does exactly what it does (Alesina, Angeloni and
Schuknecht 2005). The division of powers between member states and European institutions
is not fully explained by classic considerations of externalities and preference heterogeneity.
Our model shows that other considerations are equally crucial. E¢ ciency is maximized
by centralizing policies whose understanding by voters varies most widely across countries.
Political feasibility may require striking a balance between policies that transfer power to
the core and others that transfer accountability to the periphery.
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Figure I Corruption and Education
Corruption is the opposite of the Control of Corruption index from the World Governance Indicators. The
share of people over 25 with tertiary education is from Barro and Lee (2010).
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Figure II Corruption and Newspaper Circulation
Corruption is the opposite of the Control of Corruption index from the World Governance Indicators. News-
paper circulation per capita is from the World Development Indicators.
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Figure III Optimal Federalism
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ONLINE APPENDICES
A Extended Literature Review
Early work on the economic theory of scal federalism took a technological view of the
costs and benets of decentralization (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972). The seminal models
assumed exogenously that governments act benevolently in the interest of their constituents,
but that di¤erent structures entail di¤erent limitations. A centralized government cannot
di¤erentiate public goods across regions. Decentralized governments cannot coordinate to
internalize externalities (and may forego economies of scale). More recent studies have used a
political-economy approach both to microfound these classic assumptions and to investigate
how federalism a¤ects accountability when political agency is imperfect.
A median-voter model of direct democracy explains local welfare-maximizing policy
choices if voter preferences are symmetrically distributed around the mean (Alesina and Spo-
laore 1997, 2003). Any other distribution entails a wedge between the welfare-maximizing
policy and the median voters choice. If preferences are homogeneous within regions and
asymmetric across regions, this wedge adds a cost of centralization (Alesina, Angeloni, and
Etro 2005). If preferences are heterogeneous and asymmetric within each region as well,
centralization can either alleviate or exacerbate the bias due to the wedge between median
and average preferences (Lockwood 2008).
Legislative bargaining models account for the ine¢ cient distribution of expenditures by
a central government. Even if voters are homogeneous across regions and each region elects
a benevolent representative, a distributive distortion emerges because the government can
precisely target a minimum winning coalition and provide no public goods to a minority of
regions (Lockwood 2002). In this setting, furthermore, voters have incentives for strategic
delegation to representatives that do not share their true preferences (Besley and Coate
2003).
Distributive distortions from unconstrained centralization emerge with considerable gen-
erality when the central government is subject to political-economy frictions. Harstad (2007)
shows that bargaining between governments with asymmetric information leads to costly de-
lays, which can be eliminated by a commitment to uniformity. Thus, his model microfounds
both the uniformity constraint for the central government and the inability of local govern-
ments to cooperate e¢ ciently. Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) show that harmful targeting
of public goods to a minimum winning coalition may occur even if multiple regions elect a
single executive instead of many parliamentary representatives.
Such targeted spending does not emerge in the equilibrium of our model because idiosyn-
cratic voter preferences determine an intensive margin of electoral support. If information
is homogeneous across regions, it is equally valuable but cheaper for the incumbent to at-
tain the same expected support in two regions than twice the support in a single region.
The latter strategy would require doubling the local votersutility, and thus raising invest-
ment exponentially. As a consequence, in our model centralization and decentralization are
identical if regions have identical information.
We nd instead that heterogenous voter information provides a distinct and complemen-
tary explanation for the inability of a central government to match public-good provision
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e¢ ciently to local needs and preferences. Our microfoundation provides particularly strong
support for the assumption of a uniformity constraint because Proposition 1 nds that cen-
tralization without uniformity is unambiguously dominated, whereas in bargaining models
a uniformity constraint sometimes increases but sometimes decreases welfare under central-
ization.27
Corollary B1 in Appendix B also provides a microfoundation for failed cooperation among
local governments that is precisely complementary to Harstads (2007). In his model, politi-
cians are benevolent but asymmetric information generates bargaining frictions. In ours,
bargaining is frictionless but politicians are rent seekers. Then career concerns fail to induce
local politicians to internalize policy externalities because doing so would raise voter welfare
without signalling the incumbents ability.
Political-agency models of scal federalism have mostly stressed the accountability ben-
ets of decentralization. In particular, decentralization can help voters monitor their local
governments thanks to yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995; Belleamme and Hin-
driks 2005; Besley and Smart 2007). When a local government underperforms its neighbors,
voters know they should blame the incumbents incompetence or corruption rather than
exogenous underlying conditions that are correlated across regions. There is no scope for
yardstick competition in our setting because votersuncertainty concerns only the compe-
tence of their own government, and not also common economic fundamentals.
Myerson (2006) presents a related argument that relies on local politicianscompetition
for national o¢ ce. In his signaling model, a centralized unitary democracy has multiple
equilibria, ranging from no corruption to complete corruption. In a federal system, regional
governors are keen on building a reputation in order to run for national o¢ ce. Thus, federal-
ism eliminates the very worst equilibrium, with complete corruption at both levels though
it does not necessarily reduce aggregate corruption given the multiplicity of equilibria in
both systems.
Centralization also entails a common-agency problem that makes politicians less account-
able to voters in any single region (Seabright 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum 2007). If the exogenous ego rentsfrom holding o¢ ce are higher un-
der centralization, sharper incentives to gain re-election counteract the detrimental e¤ects
of common agency, but need not fully counterbalance them (Seabright 1996; Persson and
Tabellini 2000).
In our model, the value of holding o¢ ce derives endogenously from rent extraction rather
than exogenously from ego rents. Therefore, the proportional increase in the government
budget exactly compensates the reduced pivotality of each region. As a result, aggregate
rent extraction is identical under centralization and decentralization when voter information
is homogeneous across regions. Following Seabright (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2000),
we could assume instead that the value of o¢ ce rises less than proportionally with centraliza-
27A di¤erence between our model and prior work is that we focus on di¤erent preferences over the allocation
of resources across public goods. The literature has typically neglected this dimension and focused instead
of di¤erent preferences over the total amount of public goods provided (Lockwood 2002, 2008; Besley and
Coate 2003; Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro 2005; Harstad 2007). In reality, preferences vary on both dimensions
(Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003). For simplicity, we consider only the allocation problem. This restriction
preserves the equivalence between the allocation of the government budget and the allocation of e¤ort by
ruling politicians (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Alesina and Tabellini 2008).
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tion: bC < bL. Then, as in their models, centralization would increase rent extraction when
information is homogeneous across regions. It would reduce it if and only if heterogeneity in
voter information is large enough.
Prior work has suggested some other channels through which centralization may increase
accountability, even when voter information is homogeneous across regions. Unlike Propo-
sition 1, however, these mechanisms are characterized by considerable ambiguity. In models
of lobbying, centralization can either decrease or increase the governments susceptibility to
capture by special interest groups (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2006a, b; Blanchard and
Shleifer 2001; Lockwood 2008).
Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) highlight conicting forces in a signaling model of political
agency. In their model, some politicians are rent seekers but others are welfare maximizers.
In their rst term, rent seekers may choose to restrain their rents in order to mimic welfare
maximizers and fool voters into re-electing them. Centralization reduces votersability to
screen and dismiss corrupt politicians: rent seekers can exploit common agency and get re-
elected despite extracting maximum rents in a minority of regions. This loss of accountability
is the only consequence of centralization when rent seekers already choose restraint and a
chance of re-election at the local level. However, centralization may also incentivize rent-
seekers to reduce their rst-term rents in order to gain re-election and extract large rents in
a second term. When this incentive is missing under decentralization, either the improved
incentives or the worsened screening may dominate the overall di¤erence in accountability.28
To the best of our knowledge, Section 4 and Proposition 2 provide the rst study of
scal federalism when di¤erent government tiers control di¤erent policy instruments. Fol-
lowing Oates (1972), prior work considered each policy choice separately. Then it is natural
to compare the extremes of full centralization and full decentralization, as in Proposition
1. Joanis (2014) microfounds this classic focus on the two extremes, showing that account-
ability declines if both central and local governments are simultaneously responsible for the
same policy. In a dynamic setting, however, incentives for policy experimentation may be
optimized if a policy choice is made by local governments rst and then transferred to the
central government (Kotsogiannis and Schwager 2006; Callander and Harstad 2015).
B Pareto-Improving Centralization
Our baseline analysis focuses on the welfare consequences of government structure. Di¤er-
ences in information across regions make political integration desirable both because it yields
e¢ ciency gains from increased accountability and because it is a form of progressive redis-
tribution. Uninformed regions reap large gains while informed ones su¤er small losses, as
shown in Proposition 1. Such distributional e¤ects of centralization are appealing from the
perspective of aggregate social welfare, but they raise a question of feasibility: will informed
regions oppose and block optimal integration? This question is particularly relevant in Eu-
rope. Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that a federal structure in the European Union may be
28In a related model, González, Hindriks, and Porteiro (2013) nd that centralization weakly increases
the likelihood that politicians run hidden decits to hide their incompetence, but strictly reduces the size
of such decits. Thus, centralization may alleviate an existing political budget cycle, or conversely create it
when there is none under decentralization.
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optimal due to the large disparities in accountability across member states. But why would
Finns and Germans agree to a federation whose benets accrue to Greeks and Italians?
In this appendix, we extend our model in two directions that show how political inte-
gration can receive unanimous support. First, we allow for public-good spillovers across
regions, a classic element of the scal-federalism literature since Oates (1972). In our model,
externalities imply not only mechanically that the informed care about public goods in
uninformed regions, but also that centralization may increase government e¢ ciency in in-
formed regions too. Alternatively, we discuss how unanimity can be obtained at the expense
of welfare maximization, by combining centralization with partial discretionality in public-
good provision.
B.1. Public-Good Spillovers
We introduce externalities with a simple symmetric specication that preserves constant
aggregate returns to scale. There is a single composite public good (P = 1) and a resident i
of region l has utility
uit = ~u
i
t + (1  ) log gl;t +

L
LX
m=1
log gm;t, (B1)
where the index  2 [0; 1] measures interregional spillovers. Citizensmobility within the
United States or the European Union provides an intuitive interpretation of this setup. Each
agent has a probability  of moving, and conditional on a move he has equal probability of
moving to each region.
Public-good spillovers entail systematic di¤erences between the productivity of the central
government and that of local governments.
Proposition B1 Suppose there are spillovers in public goods across regions ( > 0). Then
the expected competence of ruling politicians is on average higher under centralization than
decentralization (E^C >
PL
l=1 E^
D
l =L). Aggregate rent extraction is lower under centraliza-
tion than decentralization regardless of di¤erences in voter information (C <
PL
l=1 
D
l =L).
Both e¢ ciency advantages of centralization are increasing in the extent of spillovers (@(E^C PL
l=1 E^
D
l =L)=@ > 0 and @
PL
l=1 
D
l =L  C

=@ > 0).
Internalizing spillovers through centralization raises the screening value of elections and
thus the expected productivity of elected politicians. Informed voter may support an incom-
petent incumbent because of his personal likability or ideological a¢ nity, but they are less
likely to be swayed by such factors when politiciansskills are more important. Public-good
spillovers imply that competence is more important for the central than the local govern-
ment. The ability of local politicians inuences local public goods only; that of central
politicians also determines spillovers from other regions. Therefore, voters are keener on
screening for competence at the central than at the local level. This sharper voter focus on
competence improves the monitoring as well as the screening value of elections. As a result,
public-good spillovers strengthen the accountability gains from centralization: rent extrac-
tion declines with political integration even when regions have identical information. Both
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e¢ ciency advantages of centralization are monotone increasing in the extent of spillovers.
The improvement in politiciansselection and incentives described by Proposition B1 is
distinct from the benets of policy coordination that Oates (1972) highlighted as a rationale
for centralization. Coordination is reected in an improvement in resource allocation rather
than in government productivity. This additional classic element is also present in our model
when we consider both a public good g that generates inter-regional spillovers  > 0 and
another public good h whose benets are purely local. Then, a resident i of region l has
utility
uit = ~u
i
t + g
"
(1  ) log gl;t + 
L
LX
m=1
log gm;t
#
+ (1  g) log hl;t, (B2)
where g 2 (0; 1) is the share of resources that would be allocated to the spillover-generating
public good by a benevolent planner. Then the equilibrium allocation of resources across
public goods is systematically di¤erent under centralization and decentralization
Corollary B1 Centralization induces the socially optimal allocation resources across pub-
lic goods (Cg = g). Decentralization induces an insu¢ cient allocation of resources to the
spillover-generating public good (Dg;l < g for all l). Under-provision is increasing in the
size of spillovers (@Dg;l=@ < 0).
Incumbents provide public goods merely to showcase their ability to their own con-
stituents. Under centralization, all beneciaries of each public good vote for the incumbents
re-election. Then career concerns are exactly aligned with social welfare across goods. Re-
sources are allocated to public goods in proportion to the full social value of each investment
and each skill. Under decentralization, instead, career concerns induce every local politi-
cian to ignore all spillovers. Externality-inducing goods are under-provided and purely local
goods are over-provided instead. Incumbents are uninterested in demonstrating their ability
at generating welfare for regions that do not vote for their re-election. As a consequence,
centralization entails endogenous gains from policy coordination.
Oates (1972) assumed that local governments maximize local residentswelfare but are
exogenously incapable of cooperating to reach Pareto improvements. Such a cooperation
failure can be microfounded through frictions in bargaining between benevolent local gov-
ernments (Harstad 2007). Corollary B1 provides the complementary microfoundation. If
bargaining is frictionless but local politicians are rent-seeking instead of benevolent, career
concerns provide them with no incentives to cooperate in the pursuit of aggregate social
welfare. Cooperation is irrelevant for the pursuit of their own goal, re-election.
B.2. Partial Discretionality
If spillovers are modest or absent, is it ever possible to obtain unanimous support for the
transfer of powers to a central government? In this context, the regressive distributive conse-
quences of centralization without a uniformity constraint have a silver lining. Discretionality
transfers power to the informed. This transfer is welfare-reducing, but it can be the price to
pay to buy their support for an e¢ ciency-increasing institutional reforms.
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Consider homogeneous, symmetric preferences ( ! 1) over a measure-one continuum
of public goods. A resident i of region l has utility
uit = ~u
i
t +
Z 1
0
log gl;t (p) dp. (B3)
Centralization is characterized by an index of discretionality ! 2 [0; 1] such that goods
p 2 [0; !] are not subject to the uniformity constraint, while goods p 2 [!; 1] are. By a
straightforward extension of Proposition 1, social welfare is maximized by full uniformity
(! = 0) and declines as discretionality increases. On the other hand, we can establish the
following result.
Proposition B2 Suppose that the variance of politiciansability is not too high (2  2).
Then there is a level of discretionality ~! 2  C ; 1 such that centralization with discretionality
~! is preferred to decentralization by every region. The minimum discretionality required for
centralization to enjoy unanimous support is lower when voters are more informed (@~!=@ <
0) and politiciansability less variable (@~!=@2 > 0).
Better incentives for central politicians reduce aggregate rent extraction and thus create
an overall surplus. Proposition B2 shows that the incentives of the central government can be
ne-tuned so that all regions share in the e¢ ciency gains from centralization, irrespective of
the distribution of voter information. Centralization transfers power over the allocation of a
share ! of public goods from uninformed to informed regions. It also transfers accountability
from informed regions to uninformed regions, inducing a uniform rent extraction C .
The uninformed gain more from reducing local rents to C than the informed lose from
raising local rents to C . Then, if !  C the gain in power is worth more to the informed
than their local decline in accountability. But if !  C the loss of power is worth less to the
uninformed than their local increase in accountability. When rent extraction and discretion-
ality are exactly matched (! = C), all regions with l 6=  strictly prefer the endogenous
allocation of resources under centralization to the one under decentralization (a region with
exactly average information is indi¤erent). Higher voter information implies lower rent ex-
traction by the central government. Then, informed regions require less discretionality to
support centralization (@~!=@ < 0).
Political integration is also redistributive with respect to screening. Central politicians
have average skills above local politicians in uninformed regions, but below local politicians
in informed ones. Unanimity requires informed regions to gain enough power to o¤set this
progressive transfer through government selection. Therefore, the required discretionality
is ~! > C , and it increases monotonically with the importance of political screening. If
the variance of ability were too high, unanimous support for centralization might prove
impossible (2 > 2). However, we view as a natural benchmark the case in which moral
hazard is a greater problem than adverse selection in political agency.
The political debate within the European Union, whose treaties are adopted by unanimity
of the member states, is consistent with the patterns described by Proposition B2. Core
countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands complain about the low
institutional quality and the ine¤ective and corrupt politicians in peripheralcountries such
as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Such complaints chime with our prediction of declining
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government accountability and productivity for the more informed regions. At the same time,
peripheral countries complain that European policy is largely dictated by core countries and
disproportionately caters to their needs and interests. Again, this accords with our prediction
of declining policy-making power for the less informed regions. Proposition B2 suggests that
intra-European frictions may be manifestations of a Pareto-improving agreement that makes
the Union benecial for all members, albeit not welfare-maximizing.
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Taking into account that the realizations of the uniform idiosyncratic shock  i are indepen-
dent across voters, the share of members of group j who vote for the incumbent conditional
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Taking into account the uniform aggregate shock 	t, the incumbents probability of re-
election conditional on the realizations of public-good provision gt equals
 (gt) = Pr
 
JX
j=1
jv
j
t (gt;	t) 
1
2
!
= Pr
 
	t 
JX
j=1
j
j
t
PX
p=1
jpE ("p;tjgp;t)
!
= E
"
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
j
j
t
PX
p=1
jpE ("p;tjgp;t)
#
=
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jpE ("p;tjgp;t)
=
1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp (log gp;t   log xp   "p;t 1) . (C2)
Taking into account the mean-zero competence shocks "p;t, the incumbents probability
of re-election conditional on his policy choices xt (and residually rt) equals
 (xt) = E [ (gt) jxt] = 1
2
+ 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp (log xp;t   log xp) . (C3)
The trade-o¤ between current rent extraction and a value R of re-election leads to policy
choices
x (R) = arg max
xt
(
b 
PX
p=1
xp;t +R (xt)
)
, (C4)
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namely
xp (R) = R
JX
j=1
jj
j
p for all p = 1; :::; P , (C5)
and thus current rent extraction
r (R) = b  
JX
j=1
jjR: (C6)
For ease of notation, let
  2
2  . (C7)
By equation (11), equilibrium rent-extraction is
r = b

1 + 
XJ
j=1
jj
 1
, (C8)
which is decreasing and convex in j.
The equilibrium allocation of resources across public goods follows the shares
p 
xp
(1  ) b =
JX
j=1
j

j
j
p. (C9)
The incumbent is re-elected if and only if
	t 
JX
j=1
jj
PX
p=1
jp"p;t. (C10)
Let t be an indicator variable for this condition. The competence of ruling politicians
evolves according to
^t = t 1
 
"It 1 + "
I
t

+
 
1  t 1
  
"Ct 1 + "
C
t

, (C11)
where the superscripts I and C refer to the incumbent and challenger in the election at the
end of period t  1.
The cumulative distribution function of ability ^p;t is
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where F" (") is the cumulative distribution function of "p;t and f" (") its probability density
function. SinceZ 1
 1
"F" (   ") f" (") d" = E ["F" (   ")] < E"E [F" (   ")] = 0, (C13)
an increase in
PJ
j=1 jj
j
p induces an increase in ^p in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance.
The unconditional expectation of ability ^p;t is
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The equilibrium utility of each member of group j equals
Euj =
PX
p=1
jpE log gp;t = log b+ log (1  ) +
PX
p=1
jp
 
E^p + log p

. (C15)
Proof of Proposition 1
In a polity composed of L regions there are LP public goods: gl;p;t is the provision of public
good p in region l at time t. Residents of each region l derive utility from public goods in
their own region only: ll;p = 
l
p while 
l
m;p = 0 for l 6= m.
Under decentralization, in each region l a local politician with ability Dl;p;t independently
invests in the provision of public goods xDl;p;t and extracts rent r
D
l;t = b 
PP
p=1 x
D
l;p;t. Equilib-
rium rent extraction is
Dl = (1 + l)
 1 , (C16)
the expected ability of a local politician is
E^Dl;p = 2lpl, (C17)
and the relative shares of each local public good are
Dl;p 
xl;p
(1  Dl ) b
= lp. (C18)
Welfare in region l is
EuDl = log b+ log
 
1  Dl

+
PX
p=1
lp
 
E^Dl;p + log 
D
l;p

, (C19)
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and aggregate welfare is
WD = log b+ log
 
1  Dl

+
1
L
LX
l=1
PX
p=1
lp
 
E^Dl;p + log 
D
l;p

. (C20)
Under centralization a single politician with ability Cp;t chooses investment in public goods
xCl;p;t for all l. and extracts rents r
C
t = bL 
PL
l=1
PP
p=1 x
C
l;p;t. We partition the P public goods
into two sets. The set U consists of public goods whose centralized provision is subject to
a uniformity constraint gCl;p;t = g
C
p;t for all l. This constraint coincides with a constraint on
resource allocation xCl;p;t = x
C
p;t for all l because ability 
C
p;t is common. The complementary
set D consists instead of public goods that the central government can provide in di¤erent
amounts to di¤erent regions. Regardless of this partition, equilibrium rent extraction is
C =
 
1 + 
 1
for  =
1
L
LX
l=1
l, (C21)
and the expected ability of a central politician is
E^Cp =
2
L
LX
l=1
l
l
p. (C22)
For expositional convenience, we characterize the allocation of resources under centralization
by the shares
Cl;p 
xCl;p
(1  C) b (C23)
relative to a regions equal share of net aggregate resources, rather than to the total
 
1  C
bL. Thus, Cl;p lies in [0; L] instead of [0; 1]. Then relative shares of each local public good
are
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lp for p 2 U (C24)
and
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Welfare in region l is
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and aggregate welfare is
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for
p =
1
L
LX
l=1
lp. (C28)
Letting E denote the expected value across a continuum of regions, aggregate welfare
under decentralization is
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while under centralization it is
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The welfare comparison can be decomposed into three elements.
1. Centralization with heterogeneous information induces a reduction in rent extraction:
log
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1  C = log El
1 + El
> E log
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1  Dl

= E log
l
1 + l
(C31)
by Jensens inequality.
2. Centralization with heterogeneous preferences induces a misallocation of ability:
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because information l and preferences l are independent.
3. Centralization with heterogeneous preferences and information induces a misallocation
of resources:
X
p2U
Elp logE
 
l
l
p

+
X
p2D
E

lp log
 
l
l
p
  logEl = PX
p=1
E
 
lp log
l
p

 
X
p2U

E
 
lp log
l
p
  Elp logElp X
p2D
Elp (logEl   E log l)
<
PX
p=1
E
 
lp log
l
p

(C33)
because information l and preferences l are independent.
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Since the distribution of preferences is symmetric across goods, it is welfare-maximizing
to apply the uniformity constraint either to all or to none. If no uniformity constraint is
applied (U = ?) then centralization is welfare-reducing because the gain from reduced rent-
seeking is less than the loss from resource misallocation, even before taking into account the
misallocation of ability:
lim
2!0
 
WD  WC = log (1 + El)  E log (1 + l)  0. (C34)
Centralization with uniformity (D = ?) is preferable to decentralization (WC  WD) if
and only if
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For a given mean of the distribution of information El = , the left-hand side can be
written as EfL
 
l; 

for a function
fL
 
l; 
  log1 + 1
l

  log

1 +
1
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
(C36)
such that
@2fL
@2l
=
1 + 2l
[(1 + l) l]
2 > 0. (C37)
Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of l increases the left-hand side of equation C35 while
leaving the right-hand side unchanged: centralization with uniformity is then more likely
to be welfare-maximizing. In the limit of maximum information heterogeneity, lim!0 l
converges to a Bernoulli distribution with Pr (l = 1) =  and the left-hand side of equation
C35 diverges. In the limit of perfect information homogeneity, lim!1 l converges to the
deterministic value  and the left-hand side of equation C35 goes to zero.
The marginal distribution of preferences for p necessarily has mean Elp = 1=P . The
right hand side of equation C35 can be written as EfR
 
lp;


for a function
fR
 
lp;

  P hlp loglp + 2  lp2i  2P + logP (C38)
such that
@2fR
@
 
lp
2 = P  1lp + 22

> 0. (C39)
Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of lp increases the right-hand side of equation C35 while
leaving the left-hand side unchanged: decentralization is then more likely to be welfare-
maximizing. In the limit of maximum heterogeneity, lim!0 lp converges to a Bernoulli
distribution with Pr
 
lp = 1

= 1=P . and the right-hand side of equation C35 goes to
logP + 2 (1  1=P ). In the limit of maximum homogeneity, lim!1 lp converges to the
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deterministic value 1=P and the right-hand side of equation C35 goes to zero.
For every non-degenerate distribution of l (i.e., for any nite ) there is a nite threshold
  0 such that centralization with uniformity is preferable to decentralization if and only if
  . The threshold is increasing in , and also increasing in  because so is the right-hand
side of equation C35.
Proof of Proposition 2
The division of powers is described by two indicator variables: 0 = 1 if and only if the
central government is tasked with providing the homogeneously desired good; 1 = 1 if and
only if it provides the idiosyncratically preferred good.
From equations (C5) and (11), equilibrium rent extraction by a local politician in region
l is
Dl = f1 + l [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)]g 1 . (C40)
The politicians expected abilities are
E^Dl;0 = (1  0)02l and E^Dl;l = (1  1) (1  0)2l, (C41)
and E^Dl;m = 0 for all m 6= l. He chooses shares
Dl;0 =
(1  0)0
(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)
(C42)
and
Dl;l =
(1  1) (1  0)
(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)
, Dl;m = 0 for all m 6= l (C43)
for the allocation of his budget bD = b  bD=L.
Equilibrium rent extraction by a central politician is
C =

1 +  [00 + 1 (1  0)]
	 1
. (C44)
His expected abilities are
E^C0 = 002 and E^
C
l = 1 (1  0)2
l
L
for l = 1; 2; :::; L. (C45)
His budget shares given his budget bC are dened again with the convention that
Cl;p 
xCl;p
(1  C) bC . (C46)
If he is entrusted with providing the homogeneously desired good he chooses a budget share
C0 =
00
00 + 1 (1  0)
if 0 2 U , (C47)
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or budget shares
Cl;0 =
00
00 + 1 (1  0)
l

if 0 2 D. (C48)
If he is entrusted with providing the idiosyncratically preferred good, he sets a budget share
Cl =
1 (1  0)
00 + 1 (1  0)
1
L
l

if l 2 U , (C49)
or budget shares
Cl;l =
1 (1  0)
00 + 1 (1  0)
l

and Cm;l = 0 for all m 6= l if l 2 D. (C50)
Welfare in region l can be decomposed into four components
Eul  ubl + ul + ul + Eul . (C51)
The allocation of resources between the two levels of government has a welfare impact
ubl = [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] log

b  bC
L

+ [00 + 1 (1  0)] log
bC
L
. (C52)
The allocation of each governments budget has a welfare impact
ul = (1  0)0 log Dl;0+(1  1) (1  0) log Dl;l+00 log Cl;0+1 (1  0) log Cl;l. (C53)
Rent extraction by the di¤erent levels of government has a welfare impact
ul = [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] log
 
1  Dl

+ [00 + 1 (1  0)] log
 
1  C . (C54)
The selection of politicians according to their skills has a welfare impact
Eul = (1  0)0E^Dl;0 + (1  1) (1  0)E^Dl;l + 00E^C0 + 1 (1  0)E^Cl . (C55)
The allocation of the budget between the two levels of government a¤ects welfare only
through the term ubl . Every region desires the unique Pareto e¢ cient allocation
bC = arg maxu
b
l (bC) = [00 + 1 (1  0)] bL, (C56)
such that the local-government budget is
bD = [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] b. (C57)
Uniformity constraints a¤ect welfare only through the therm ul . If 0 = 1, imposing
a uniformity constraint on centralized provision of the homogeneously desired public good
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increases aggregate social welfare by
0
 
log    1
L
LX
l=1
log l
!
 0. (C58)
If 1 = 1, imposing a uniformity constraint on centralized provision of the idiosyncratically
preferred public good reduces welfare in every region by
  (1  0) logL  0. (C59)
With the e¢ cient central-government budget and the welfare-maximizing uniformity con-
straints,
ubl + u

l = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0) + 1 (1  0)
 
log l   log 

. (C60)
With equilibrium rent extraction,
ul = [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] log
[(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] l
1 + [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] l
+ [00 + 1 (1  0)] log
[00 + 1 (1  0)] 
1 + [00 + 1 (1  0)] 
. (C61)
With the equilibrium skill of incumbent politicians,
Eul = 
2

20

(1  0) l + 0

+ (1  0)2

1  L  1
L
1

l

. (C62)
Abstracting from di¤erences between sample distributions and population distributions
thanks to the assumption of a continuum of regions (L!1), aggregate social welfare is
W = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0)  1 (1  0) (logEl   E log l)
+ [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)]E log
[(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] l
1 + [(1  0)0 + (1  1) (1  0)] l
+ [00 + 1 (1  0)] log
[00 + 1 (1  0)] El
1 + [00 + 1 (1  0)] El
+

20 + (1  1) (1  0)2

2El. (C63)
Under full decentralization (0 = 1 = 0) welfare is
WD = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0)
+ E log
l
1 + l
+

20 + (1  0)2

2El. (C64)
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Under a federal system (0 = 1 and 1 = 0) it is
WF = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0)
+ (1  0)E log (1  0) l
1 + (1  0) l + 0 log
0El
1 + 0El
+

20 + (1  0)2

2El. (C65)
Under full centralization (0 = 1 = 1) it is
WC = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0)
  (1  0) (logEl   E log l) + log El
1 + El
+ 20
2El. (C66)
Under a reverse federal system (0 = 0 and 1 = 1) welfare would be
W F = log b+ 0 log0 + (1  0) log (1  0)  (1  0) (logEl   E log l)
+ 0E log
0l
1 + 0l
+ (1  0) log (1  0) El
1 + (1  0) El + 
2
0
2El < WC , (C67)
so this arrangement is dominated by full centralization.
To compare the three undominated government structures, it is convenient to rescale wel-
fare by an additive constant log b+0 log0+(1  0) log (1  0)+

20 + (1  1) (1  0)2

2El. Then welfare under full decentralization is
WD = E log
l
1 + l
(C68)
independent of 0 up to the rescaling.
Welfare under a federal system is
WF = (1  0)E log (1  0) l
1 + (1  0) l + 0 log
0El
1 + 0El
, (C69)
with limits
lim
0!0
WF = E log
l
1 + l
< lim
0!1
WF = log
El
1 + El
. (C70)
Its derivative with respect to 0 is
@WF
@0
=  E

log
(1  0) l
1 + (1  0) l +
1
1 + (1  0) l

+ log
0El
1 + 0El
+
1
1 + 0El
, (C71)
with limits
lim
0!0
@WF
@0
=  1 and lim
0!1
@WF
@0
= +1. (C72)
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It is a globally convex function of 0:
@2WF
@20
=
1
1  0E [1 + (1  0) l]
 2 +
1
0
(1 + 0El) 2 > 0. (C73)
Welfare under full centralization (0 = 1 = 1) is
WC = log
El
1 + El
  (1  0) (logEl   E log l)  (1  0)2 2El, (C74)
with limits
lim
0!0
WC = log
El
1 + El
  logEl + E log l   2El
< lim
0!1
WC = log
El
1 + El
. (C75)
It is a monotone increasing and concave function of 0:
@WC
@0
= logEl   E log l + 2 (1  0)2El > 0 > @
2WC
@20
=  22El. (C76)
Its rst derivative has limits
lim
0!0
@WC
@0
= logEl   E log l + 22El > lim
0!1
@WC
@0
= logEl   E log l. (C77)
There is a threshold DC 2 (0; 1) dened by WC (DC) = WD such that complete
centralization yields higher welfare than complete decentralization if and only if  > DC .
There is a second threshold DF 2 (0; 1) dened by DF > 0 and WF (DF ) = WD
such that a federal allocation of powers yields higher welfare than complete decentralization
if and only if 0 > DF . There is a threshold FC 2 (0; 1) dened by FC < 1 and
WC (FC) = WF (FC) such that complete centralization yields higher welfare than a
federal allocation of powers if and only if 0 > FC .
Since WD is independent of 0, WF (0) convex and WC (0) concave, with WD (0) =
WF (0) > WC (0) and WF (1) = WC (1) > WD (1), two cases are possible:
1. If DF < DC < FC then complete decentralization is optimal for 0 2 [0; DF ],
a federal allocation of powers for 0 2 [DF ; FC ], and complete centralization for
0 2 [FC ; 1].
2. If FC  DC  DF then complete decentralization is optimal for 0 2 [0; DC ]
and complete decentralization for 0 2 [DC ; 1], while a federal allocation of powers
is dominated.
For a given mean of the distribution of information El = , the denition of DF can
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be written EfDF
 
l; DF ; 

= 0, where
fDF
 
l; ; 
  (1  ) log (1  ) l
1 + (1  ) l +  log

1 + 
  log l
1 + l
, (C78)
such that
@2fDF
@2l
= 
1 + 2 (2  ) l + 3 (1  ) (l)2
fl (1 + l) [1 + (1  ) l]g2
> 0. (C79)
Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of l increases EfDF
 
l; DF ; 

. At the same time,
@EfDF
 
l; DF ; 

=@ > 0 because @WF (DF ) =@ > 0 = @WD=@. Hence, DF is
increasing in .
The denition of FC can be written EfFC
 
l; FC ; ; 

= 0, where
fFC
 
l; ; ; 
  log 
1 + 
  (1  )  log    log l  (1  )2 2
  (1  )E log (1  ) l
1 + (1  ) l    log

1 + 
, (C80)
such that
@2fFC
@2l
=   (1  )
3 2
[1 + (1  ) l]2
< 0. (C81)
Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of l decreases EfFC
 
l; FC ; ; 

. At the same
time, @EfFC
 
l; FC ; ; 

=@ > 0 because @WC (FC) > @WF (FC). Hence, FC is
decreasing in .
In the limit as information becomes perfectly homogeneous (lim!1 l =  for all l),
lim
!1
WD = log

1 + 
, (C82)
while
lim
!1
WF = (1  0) log (1  0) 

1 + (1  0) 
+ 0 log
0
1 + 0
, (C83)
which is symmetric around its minimum 0 = 1=2, and
lim
!1
WC = log

1 + 
  (1  0)2 2. (C84)
Thus
lim
!1
DC = lim
!1
DF = 1 > lim
!1
FC . (C85)
In the limit as information becomes maximally heterogeneous (! 0 so Pr (l = 1) = 
and Pr (l = 0) = 1   ), lim!0WD = lim!0WF = lim!0WC =  1, with well-dened
ratios
lim
!0
WF
WD
= lim
!0
WC
WD
= 1   < lim
!0
WC
WF
= 1. (C86)
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Intuitively, a fraction 1    of regions unavoidably tend towards no provision of their ideal
variety of the idiosyncratically preferred public good, but they also tend towards no provision
of the homogeneously desired good if and only if its provision is decentralized. Thus
lim
!0
DF = lim
!0
DC = 0 < lim
!0
FC . (C87)
Thus, there exists a nite threshold  () > 0 such that FC  DC  DF if and
only if   . The threshold is increasing in  because an increase in  shifts down WC
while leaving WD and WF una¤ected. Hence, @FC=@ > 0 and and @DC=@ > 0, while
@DF=@ = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
In a federal system 0 = 1 and 1 = 0. Therefore, equilibrium rent extraction is
C =
 
1 + 0
 1
and Dl = [1 + (1  0) l] 1 . (C88)
The expected skills of incumbents are
E^C0 = 02 and E^
D
l;l = (1  0)2l, while E^Cl = E^Dl;0 = 0. (C89)
The e¢ cient budget allocation is
bC = 0bL and b

D = (1  0) b. (C90)
Aggregate rent extraction is
F = 0
C + (1  0)EDl , (C91)
such that
@F
@0
=
 
1 + 0
 2   E[1 + (1  0) l] 2	 =  C2   E h Dl 2i (C92)
and
@2F
@20
= 2

C
@C
@0
  E

Dl
@Dl
@0

< 0. (C93)
Thus, aggregate rent extraction F reaches a maximum at 0 such that 
1 + 0
 2
= E

[1 + (1  0) l] 2
	
. (C94)
For a given mean of the distribution of information, the denition of 0 can be written
EfF
 
l; 0; 

= 0, where
fF
 
l; ; 
  [1 + (1  ) l] 2    1 +  2 , (C95)
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such that
@2fF
@2l
= 6 [(1  ) ]2 [1 + (1  ) l] 4 > 0. (C96)
Therefore, a mean-preserving spread of l increases EfF
 
l; ; 

. At the same time, @EfF (l;
; )=@ > 0. Hence 0 is increasing in . In the limit case of homogeneous information,
lim!1 0 = 1=2. In the limit case of maximum information heterogeneity lim!0 0 > 0
because the threshold satises
 
1 + 0
 2
=
 
1  +  [1 + (1  0) ] 2.
A mean-preserving spread of l also increases average rent extraction by local governments
EDl = E

[1 + (1  0) l] 1
	
(C97)
because Dl is a convex function of l: It does not a¤ect 
C . Therefore, EDl and @F are
decreasing in .
Proof of Proposition 3
Let
 
lIL; 
l
UL; 
l
IR; 
l
UR

denote the relative shares of the four groups in region ls population:
lip  l;i;p=
P
i;p l;i;p. Taking into account rent extraction and the resolution of distributional
conict, the equilibrium allocation of resources to each public good p 2 fL;Rg in region l is
xl;p =
b
 
I
l
Ip + U
l
Up

1 + 

I
 
lIL + 
l
IR

+ U
 
lUL + 
l
UR
 . (C98)
The regional government has expected competence at providing each public good equal to
E^l;p = 2
 
I
l
Ip + U
l
Up

. (C99)
The expected utility of a resident of region l with partisan preferences p 2 fL;Rg is
Eulp = log xl;p + E^l;p (C100)
whose derivatives with respect to the shares of like-minded residents are
@Eulp
@lip
=
i
I
l
Ip + U
l
Up
1 + 
 
I
l
I:p + U
l
U:p

1 + 

I
 
lIL + 
l
IR

+ U
 
lUL + 
l
UR

+ 2i > 0 for i 2 fI; Ug (C101)
and with respects to the shares of opposite partisans
@Eulp
@li:p
=   i
1 + 

I
 
lIL + 
l
IR

+ U
 
lUL + 
l
UR
 < 0 for i 2 fI; Ug . (C102)
Thus, any Pareto-e¢ cient unconstrained partition is perfectly separated by preferences:
nlIL = n
l
UL = 0 or n
l
IR = n
l
IR = 0.
Welfare in region l with homogeneous preferences p and a share lI of better-informed
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voters is
Eulp = log
b

U + (I   U)lI

1 + 

U + (I   U)lI
 + 2 U + (I   U)lI , (C103)
such that
@Eulp
@lI
= (I   U)
 
1
U + (I   U)lI
 
1 + 

U + (I   U)lI
	 + 2! > 0 (C104)
and
@2Eulp
@
 
lI
l =   (I   U)2

1 + 2

U + (I   U)lI
	
U + (I   U)lI
2 
1 + 

U + (I   U)lI
	2 < 0. (C105)
Thus, the welfare-maximizing unconstrained partition equalizes the share of better-informed
voters across regions with the same preferences.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let the total population be exogenously distributed into regions l 2 f1; 2g and preferences
p 2 fL;Rg according to the probability distribution Pl;p. Let the average information of
each group be l;r. Under separation, the expected utility of each citizen is
EuSl;p = log b+ log
E (jl)
1 + E (jl) + log

P (pjl) l;p
E (jl)

+ 2P (pjl) l;p, (C106)
while under integration it is
EuIl;p = log b+ log
E
1 + E
+ log

P (p)
E (jp)
E

+ 2P (p)E (jp) . (C107)
Thus, welfare under separation is
WS = log b+ E log
E (jl)
1 + E (jl) + E logP (pjl) + E log    E logE (jl)
+ 2E [P (pjl)] , (C108)
while under integration it is
WI = log b+ log
E
1 + E
+ E logP (p) + E logE (jp)  logE + 2E [P (p)] . (C109)
Let the distribution of population be
P1;L = P2;R =
1 + 
4
and P1;R = P2;L =
1  
4
(C110)
and information
1;L = 2;R =  and 1;R = 2;L =  (1  ) . (C111)
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Then, welfare under separation is
WS = log b+ log
 [1  (1  ) =2]
1 +  [1  (1  ) =2]   log 2
+
1
2
[(1 + ) log (1 + ) + (1  ) log (1  )]
+
1  
2
log (1  )  log

1  1  
2


+
1
4
2

2
 
1 +  2
  (1  )2  , (C112)
while under integration it is
WI = log b+ log
 [1  (1  ) =2]
1 +  [1  (1  ) =2]  log 2 +
1
4
2 [2  (1  ) ] . (C113)
The welfare gain (or loss) from integration is
W = log

1  1  
2


  1  
2
log (1  )
  1
2
[(1 + ) log (1 + ) + (1  ) log (1  )]  1
4
2 [2 + (1  ) ] , (C114)
with limits
lim
!0
W =  1
2
[(1 + ) log (1 + ) + (1  ) log (1  )]  1
2
2 2 < 0 (C115)
and
lim
!1
W =1. (C116)
The rst derivative is
@W
@
=
1
2
(1   2) 
[2  (1  ) ] (1  )  
1
4
2 (1  ) , (C117)
with limits
lim
!0
@W
@
=  1
4
2 (1  ) < 0, and lim
!1
@W
@
=1. (C118)
The second derivative is
@2W
@2
=
1
2
(1   2) 2  (1  ) 2
[2  (1  ) ]2 (1  )2 > 0. (C119)
Thus there is a unique value  2 (0; 1) such that W  0 if and only if   .
Comparative statics are @=@ > 0 because
@W
@2
=  1
4
 [2 + (1  ) ] < 0, (C120)
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and @=@ > 0 because
@W
@
=

2  (1  )  +
1
2
log (1  )
  1
2
[log (1 + )  log (1  )]  1
4
2 [4 + (1  2) ] < 0. (C121)
Proof of Proposition B1
If a voter i in region l has utility
uit = ~u
i
t + (1  ) log gl;t +

L
LX
m=1
log gm;t, (C122)
the expected ability of a local politician is
E^Dl = 2

1  L  1
L

l (C123)
and rent extraction under decentralization is
Dl =

1 + 

1  L  1
L

l
 1
. (C124)
The expected ability of a central politician is E^C = 2, so
E^C   1
L
LX
l=1
E^Dl = 2
L  1
L
> 0 for all  > 0 (C125)
with
@
@
 
E^C   1
L
LX
l=1
E^Dl
!
= 2
L  1
L
> 0. (C126)
Rent extraction under centralization is C =
 
1 + 
 1
, so
@
@
 
1
L
LX
l=1
Dl   C
!
= 
L  1
L2
LX
l=1
l
 
Dl
2
> 0, (C127)
with
lim
!0
1
L
LX
l=1
Dl   C  0. (C128)
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Proof of Corollary B1
Under centralization, the share of the spillover-inducing good in each region l is
Cg = g (C129)
with the welfare-maximizing uniformity constraint. Even without a uniformity constraint,
Cg;l = g

 + (1  ) l

) 1
L
LX
l=1
Cg;l = g, (C130)
so the allocation is socially optimal across goods although not across regions.
Under decentralization,
Dg;l =
 
1  L 1
L


g
1  L 1
L
g
< g, (C131)
such that
@Dg;l
@
=   g
 
1  g
 
1  L 1
L
g
2 L  1L < 0. (C132)
Proof of Proposition B2
Under decentralization, region l has welfare
EuDl = log b+ log
l
1 + l
+ 2l. (C133)
Under centralization,
EuCl = log b+ log

1 + 
+ 2 + !
 
log l   log 

. (C134)
Thus region l prefers centralization if and only if
log (1 + l)  (1  !) log l   2l  log
 
1 + 
  (1  !) log    2. (C135)
The left-hand side is a function fP with
@fP
@l
=

1 + l
  1  !
l
  2 (C136)
and
@2fP
@2l
=
1  !
2l
 


1 + l
2
. (C137)
Therefore, it has a minimum at l =  if and only if
2 <


 
1 + 
2 and ! = 11 +  + 2  ~!, (C138)
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such that ~! 2

C ; 1   1  C2 with
@~!
@2
=  > 0 (C139)
and
@~!
@
= 2    
1 + 
2 < 0. (C140)
When ! = ~!,
@fP
@l
=
2
(1 + l) l
 
l   
 " 1
2
 
1 + 
   1

  l
#
, (C141)
so the only other stationary point of fP is a maximum. fP is monotone increasing in l 2 
; 1

if
2  
 (1 + )
 
1 + 
  2. (C142)
If (but not only if) this last condition holds, then every region with l 6=  strictly prefers
centralization with discretionality ~! to decentralization.
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